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THE RIGHT TO (SAME-SEX) DIVORCE 
Judith M. Stinson† 
ABSTRACT 
Divorces are granted every day in every state. In the vast 
majority of cases, there is no question that the court can and 
should grant the divorce. But in a growing subset of divorce 
cases—those involving same-sex couples—courts are refusing to 
consider requests for divorce on the merits. Six states and the 
District of Columbia currently permit same-sex couples to marry, 
yet thirty-eight states have either adopted constitutional 
amendments or enacted statutes that prevent their courts from 
recognizing those same-sex marriages validly entered into within 
another jurisdiction. But what happens when a same-sex couple, 
legally married in one jurisdiction, seeks to dissolve their 
marriage in a state that prohibits the recognition of their same-sex 
union? Most courts have thus far refused to grant a divorce to 
same-sex couples on the ground that the court lacks subject-matter 
jurisdiction to hear the matter. Yet the state where the couple was 
married also lacks jurisdiction because the couple is not domiciled 
there. This Article argues that denying any individual the ability to 
divorce is improper. Civilized societies ought to permit divorce for 
a variety of reasons, and providing access to a forum to adjudicate 
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genuine disputes, including requests to divorce, avoids the 
potential of violating the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause. Denying jurisdiction is unrelated to legitimate state 
interests because by refusing to grant same-sex divorces, same-sex 
couples remain married—the exact result about which the state 
complains in the first instance. 
 
“A Texas court has no more power to issue a divorce decree for a 
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INTRODUCTION 
Almost 5,000 divorces are granted in the United States each day.2 
In almost all cases, there is no question that the court has subject-
matter jurisdiction and no question that the court will ultimately grant 
the divorce.3 The vast majority of married couples in the United 
                                                                                                                  
1 Mireles v. Mireles, No. 01–08–00499–CV, 2009 WL 884815, at *2 (Tex. App. Apr. 2, 
2009) (setting aside a prior Texas divorce decree and declaring the marriage void because the 
former husband was born a biological female and hence, the underlying marriage was a void 
same-sex marriage). 
2 ROSE M. KREIDER & RENEE ELLIS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, P70–125, NUMBER, TIMING, 
AND DURATION OF MARRIAGES AND DIVORCES: 2009, at 20 tbl.11 (2011), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/p70-125.pdf (showing 1,734,000 divorces granted in 
2008; divided by seven days per week, about 4,750 divorces are granted each day, and using a 
five-day work week, the number of divorces granted each day approaches 6,700). 
3 See, e.g., HERBERT JACOB, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE 
LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 1–2 (1988) (using the example that all states give an adulterer as 
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States can exit their marriage with relative ease. Yet divorce is often 
impossible to obtain in a growing number of cases—those where the 
two parties involved in the divorce are of the same gender.  
The problem stems from two sources: (1) inconsistent domicile 
requirements for marriage and divorce; and (2) statutory or 
constitutional provisions in most states that prohibit courts from 
recognizing same-sex marriages. First, most states impose no 
residency requirement for marriage,4 but every state requires 
residency for divorce.5 Second, twenty-nine states have adopted 
constitutional amendments that explicitly prohibit recognizing same-
sex marriages validly entered into in another jurisdiction,6 and 
another nine states have enacted statutes that prohibit recognizing 
same-sex marriages.7 
And the problem is likely to grow exponentially in the near 
future.8 State-approved, i.e., “civil,”9 same-sex marriage has been 
                                                                                                                  
 
much standing to sue as the “innocent” party, stating that “[d]ivorces are usually no longer 
issued on a basis of marital misbehavior; courts grant them simply when one or both spouses 
allege that their marriage has been irretrievably broken by irreconcilable differences”). 
4 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 207, § 19 (2007) (requiring a three-day waiting period 
to obtain a marriage license but imposing no requirement that the parties be Massachusetts 
residents); HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 
38 (1968) (stating that “[i]n a few states the waiting period is made longer for non-residents than 
for residents,” which implies that in most states residents and non-residents can marry without a 
waiting period).  
5 See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 4, at 144, 285–86 (indicating that most courts and states 
have a residency requirement for divorce); Courtney G. Joslin, Modernizing Divorce 
Jurisdiction: Same-Sex Couples and Minimum Contacts, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1669, 1679 (2011) 
(explaining that almost every state has residency requirements such that one or more of the 
parties has to be domiciled in that state for divorce to proceed in that forum). This Article 
focuses on state law because marriage and divorce are creatures of state, not federal, law. See, 
e.g., De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956) (stating that domestic law is primarily a 
state concern).  
6 Those states are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, 
Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, 
Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin. William C. Duncan, Thirty (30) State 
Marriage Amendments and Maine Question 1: Language, Votes, and Origins, reprinted in Lynn 
D. Wardle, Section Three of the Defense of Marriage Act: Deciding, Democracy, and the 
Constitution, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 951, app. 1 (2010). Hawaii is included within the Appendix; 
Hawaii’s constitutional amendment, however, only states that the “legislature shall have the 
power to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples,” which it has done. Id. at 966 (emphasis 
added) (citation omitted).  
7 Those states are Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Minnesota, New Hampshire, North Carolina, 
Pennsylvania, Washington, and West Virginia. See Christy M. Glass et al., Toward a ‘European 
Model’ of Same-Sex Marriage Rights: A Viable Pathway for the U.S.?, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 
132, 135 n.9 (2011) (listing all states that have either a constitutional amendment or statute that 
prohibits recognition of same-sex marriages).  
8 An estimated 80,000 same-sex couples are legally married in the United States, with 
approximately 50,000 of them marrying in a U.S. state and the other 30,000 marrying in another 
country, such as Canada; another 85,000 same-sex couples are in civil union-type relationships 
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permitted in the United States for seven years;10 it is currently legal in 
seven states and Washington, D.C.11 And the number of states that 
permit same-sex marriage is likely to grow.12  
                                                                                                                  
 
that provide the same benefits as marriage. Press Release, Williams Inst., Williams Institute 
Experts Comment on Department of Justice DOMA Decision (Feb. 24, 2011), available at 
http://freemarry.3cdn.net/f373007d99b7cff5f1_41m6bnchp.pdf. 
Furthermore, a recent study estimates that over eight million American adults identify as 
lesbian, gay, or bisexual; equal to “3.5% of the adult population.” Gary J. Gates, How Many 
People are Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender?, THE WILLIAMS INST., 6 (Apr. 2011), 
http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Gates-How-Many-People-LGBT-Apr-
2011.pdf. 
9 Civil marriage has been described as “a publicly required contract” whereby the state 
legitimizes the marital relationship. David Novak, Jewish Marriage and Civil Law: A Two-Way 
Street?, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1059, 1070 (2000). Religious marriage, on the other hand, 
whereby a religious institution legitimizes the bond, is now “a purely voluntary matter.” Id. This 
Article is concerned only with civil marriage and divorce. 
10 Massachusetts has permitted same-sex marriage since 2004. Maxine Eichner, Marriage 
and the Elephant: The Liberal Democratic State’s Regulation of Intimate Relationships Between 
Adults, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 25, 27 n.6 (2007). 
11 Massachusetts, Connecticut, Iowa, Vermont, New Hampshire, New York, and 
Washington, as well as Washington, D.C., permit same-sex couples to marry. CONN. GEN. 
STAT. Ann. § 46b–20(4) (West Supp. 2011) (“‘Marriage’ means the legal union of two 
persons.”); D.C. CODE § 46–401(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011) (“Marriage is the legally 
recognized union of 2 persons. Any person may enter into a marriage in the District of 
Columbia with another person, regardless of gender . . . .”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:1–a 
(Supp. 2011) (“Marriage is the legally recognized union of 2 people. Any person who otherwise 
meets the eligibility requirements of this chapter may marry any other eligible person regardless 
of gender.”); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10–a (McKinney Supp. 2012) (“A marriage that is 
otherwise valid shall be valid regardless of whether the parties to the marriage are of the same or 
different sex.”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (2010) (“Marriage is the legally recognized union of 
two people.”); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.010 (eff. June 7, 2012) (“Marriage is a civil contract 
between two persons who have each attained the age of eighteen years, and who are otherwise 
capable.”); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 906–07 (Iowa 2009) (holding that Iowa’s statute 
that prohibited same-sex marriage unconstitutional); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 
N.E.2d 941, 969–70 (Mass. 2003) (finding that the Massachusetts law that prohibited same-sex 
marriage violated the Massachusetts constitution).  
12 For five years, Massachusetts was the sole state that permitted same-sex marriage. See 
supra note 10; see also John R. Ellement & Jonathan Saltzman, R.I. Court Won’t Let Gay 
Couple Divorce, BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 8, 2007, at B1 (stating that Massachusetts was the first state 
to permit same-sex marriage). In the past two years, however, six additional states and 
Washington D.C. have joined Massachusetts in granting same-sex marriages. See supra note 11 
(citing the states that permit same-sex marriage). Same-sex marriages will also be valid in 
Maryland beginning January 1, 2013. MD. CODE ANN. § 2–201 (B) (effective Jan. 1, 2013) 
(“[o]nly a marriage between two individuals who are not otherwise prohibited from marrying is 
valid in this State.”) (replacing “[o]nly a marriage between a man and a woman is valid.”); 2–
202 (prohibiting marriages between certain blood relatives); MD. H.B. 438 (March 1, 2012). 
Same-sex marriages were also lawful in California for a period of time after the state supreme 
court ruled that the restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples violated the state constitution. In 
re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 452 (Cal. 2008). Following a voter initiative amending the 
state constitution to prohibit same-sex marriages, a federal district court ruled the voter initiative 
violated the federal constitution. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1003 (N.D. 
Cal. 2010). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently affirmed the district court, finding that 
Proposition 8 violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Perry v. 
Brown, 10–16696, 2012 WL 372713, at *2 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2012). 
Furthermore, the increasing availability of same-sex marriage internationally is likely to 
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Considering that half of all marriages are projected to end in 
divorce,13 it stands to reason that some of the same-sex couples who 
have legally married (or have entered a lawful civil union)14 have 
considered or filed for divorce.15 And most of those couples probably 
do not live in a state that recognizes their same-sex marriage, whether 
the couple moved away from the state in which they married or 
simply travelled there to obtain the marriage in the first place. But 
what happens when a same-sex couple files for divorce in a state that 
does not recognize same-sex marriage?16  
                                                                                                                  
 
exacerbate this problem. See Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, State Regulation of Sexuality in 
International Human Rights Law and Theory, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 797, 851–55 (2008) 
(describing changes in the international landscape, including such actors as Europe, Canada, and 
South Africa, with respect to same-sex marriage). 
13 Stephen J. Bahr, Social Science Research on Family Dissolution: What It Shows and 
How It Might Be of Interest to Family Law Reformers, 4 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 5, 5 (2002). For a 
state-by-state comparison of divorce rates, with Massachusetts touting the lowest percentage 
and Nevada the highest, see I Don’t: Divorce Rates by State, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 13, 2010), 
http://s.wsj.net/public/resources/documents/st_DIVORCE_20100813.html. Even for those 
married in the 1950’s, one out of every three couples divorced. STEPHANIE COONTZ, 
MARRIAGE, A HISTORY 252 (2005). 
Procedurally, one or both parties files a “petition for dissolution” to dissolve the marriage 
or civil union. See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, Counselors and Gatekeepers: The Professional 
Responsibilities of Family Lawyers in Divorce Cases, 79 UMKC L. REV. 417, 421 (2010) (using 
“petition for dissolution” interchangeably with “divorce”). This Article uses the common term 
“divorce” to refer to that process. 
14 In addition to marriage, nine states (California, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Nevada, 
New Jersey, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Washington) currently offer same-sex couples 
equivalent benefits under either civil union or domestic partnership laws. Marriage Equality and 
Other Relationship Recognition Laws, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, 
http://www.hrc.org/documents/Relationship_Recognition_Laws_Map.pdf (last updated July 6, 
2011). This Article generally focuses on marriages rather than civil unions or domestic 
partnerships, although many of the arguments regarding divorce apply in those contexts as well. 
15 See, e.g., John Schwartz, When Same-Sex Marriages End, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 2, 2011, at 
SR 3 (discussing the problem of same-sex divorce); Associated Press, First Gay Marriage, Now 
Gay Divorce, FOXNEWS.COM (Dec. 10, 2004), 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,141198,00.html (discussing the first same-sex divorces 
in Massachusetts); Jessica Dye, New York Marriage Bill Paves Way for Same-Sex Divorce, 
REUTERS (Jun. 25, 2011, 10:45 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/25/us-
gaymarriage-new-york-divorce-idUSTRE75O0GV20110625 (explaining that the New York 
same-sex marriage law will replace the same-sex divorce law created on an ad hoc basis with 
standard domestic relations law); Prominent Same-Sex Marriage Advocates Filing for Divorce, 
CBS SAN FRANCISCO (Jun. 7, 2011, 9:50 PM) 
http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2011/06/07/same-sex-marriage-advocates-filing-for-divorce/ 
(discussing the divorce of two same-sex marriage advocates in California); Rachel Holt, First 
Celebrity Gay Split, ERUDITION (Nov. 2008), 
http://www.eruditiononline.co.uk/article.php?id=322 (discussing the divorce of two British 
celebrities).  
16 The difficulty same-sex couples have obtaining a same-sex divorce has garnered 
significant media attention. See, e.g., Sue Horton, The Next Same-Sex Challenge: Divorce, L.A. 
TIMES, July 25, 2008, at A1 available at http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jul/25/local/me-
gaydivorce25 (discussing a case of two women whose unsuccessfully attempted to divorce in 
Rhode Island); Eve Conant, The Right to Love—and Loss, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 13, 2010, 8:00 
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Generally, courts have refused to grant same-sex divorces on the 
ground that the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction because of state 
statutory or constitutional law.17 This Article argues that states have 
an affirmative obligation to grant all divorces, including those of 
same-sex couples. Furthermore, granting those divorces allows courts 
to avoid violating the United States Constitution’s guarantee of Due 
Process. 
A number of scholars have argued that states have an obligation to 
grant same-sex marriages, primarily on constitutional grounds.18 
Some scholars have also addressed states’ obligation to recognize 
same-sex marriages validly entered into elsewhere, again primarily on 
constitutional grounds.19 And a few have argued that states are 
                                                                                                                  
 
PM), http://www.newsweek.com/2010/04/13/the-right-to-love-and-loss.html (describing the 
difficulties a same-sex couple experienced when ending their out of state marriage); Stephanie 
Chen, Serious Legal Hurdles of Gay Divorce, CNN (May 3, 2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-
05-03/living/texas.gay.divorce_1_gay-marriage-gay-divorce-same-sex-divorce?_s=PM:LIVING 
(discussing the uncertainty of obtaining a same-sex divorce in states which do not allow same-
sex marriage).  
17 See infra Part I.B (discussing the reasons for which courts refuse to grant same-sex 
divorces).  
18 See, e.g., Carlos A. Ball, The Positive in the Fundamental Right to Marry: Same-Sex 
Marriage in the Aftermath of Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1184, 1186–87 (2004) 
(discussing the use of substantive due process arguments to force states to recognize same-sex 
marriages); Richard A. Epstein, Caste and the Civil Rights Laws: From Jim Crow to Same-Sex 
Marriages, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2456, 2460 (1994) (stating current bans against same-sex 
marriages should be rejected based on fundamental principles of freedom of association); 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV. 1419, 1425 (1993) 
(noting that the prohibition against same-sex marriage could be considered sexual 
discrimination and violate the Constitution); R.A. Lenhardt, Beyond Analogy: Perez v. Sharp, 
Antimiscegenation Law, and the Fight for Same-Sex Marriage, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 846–47 
(2008) (discussing the constitutional implications of Perez and its effects on same-sex marriage, 
where it constitutes identity-based restrictions); Martha C. Nussbaum, A Right to Marry?, 98 
CALIF. L. REV. 667, 692–93 (2010) (characterizing the prohibition against same-sex marriage as 
a form of sex-based discrimination that should form a suspect classification); Nelson Tebbe & 
Deborah A. Widiss, Equal Access and the Right to Marry, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1375, 1382 
(2010) (rejecting due process and equal protection as arguments supporting marriage for same-
sex marriages, but suggesting an equal access framework for rethinking the constitutional status 
of nontraditional families). 
19 See generally ANDREW KOPPELMAN, SAME SEX, DIFFERENT STATES: WHEN SAME-SEX 
MARRIAGES CROSS STATE LINES (2006); see also Barbara J. Cox, Same-Sex Marriage and 
Choice of Law: If We Marry in Hawaii, Are We Still Married When We Return Home?, 1994 
WISC. L. REV. 1033, 1040 (arguing for using choice-of-law rules to encourage recognition of 
same-sex marriages out-of-state because it eliminates overbroad state interference into private 
lives); Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage, Choice of Law, and Public Policy, 76 TEX. L. 
REV. 921, 934 (1998) (arguing that there are a number of choice-of-law rules that could be used 
by same-sex couples); Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the 
Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1966–68 (1997) (arguing that 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause makes DOMA unconstitutional); Hillel Y. Levin, Resolving 
Interstate Conflicts Over Same-Sex Non-Marriage, 63 FLA. L. REV. 47, 63 (2011) (discussing 
Kramer’s position); Peter Nicolas, Common Law Same-Sex Marriage, 43 CONN. L. REV. 931, 
934 (2011) (discussing current recognition of out-of-state common-law marriages amongst the 
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obligated to recognize same-sex divorces entered elsewhere,20 
generally on full faith and credit grounds.21  
But only a few scholars have addressed, even summarily, states’ 
refusal to grant same-sex divorces.22 Regardless of whether states 
permit or even recognize same-sex marriages, this Article addresses 
states’ separate, independent obligation to grant divorces, including 
for same-sex couples.23  
                                                                                                                  
 
states); Linda Silberman, Same-Sex Marriage: Refining the Conflict of Laws Analysis, 153 U. 
PA. L. REV. 2195, 2208–09 (2005) (discussing the recognition of extraterritorial marriages 
amongst sister states); Tobias Barrington Wolff, Interest Analysis in Interjurisdictional 
Marriage Disputes, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2215, 2217–18 (2005) (discussing interests asserted by 
courts that refuse to recognize out-of-state same-sex marriages and whether those interests are 
consistent with Supreme Court precedent). 
20 See, e.g., Bradley J. Betlach, The Unconstitutionality of the Minnesota Defense of 
Marriage Act: Ignoring Judgments, Restricting Travel and Purposeful Discrimination, 24 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 407, 410 (1998) (arguing that the federal Defense of Marriage Act violates 
the Full Faith and Credit clause of the Constitution); Mark Strasser, Life After DOMA, 17 DUKE 
J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 399, 404 (2010) (analyzing DOMA’s potential effect on same-sex 
divorce); Kathryn J. Harvey, Note, The Rights of Divorced Lesbians: Interstate Recognition of 
Child Custody Judgments in the Context of Same-Sex Divorce, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1379, 
1412–18 (2009) (discussing the issues faced by same-sex couples in child custody disputes). 
21 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.  
22 L. Lynn Hogue, The Constitutional Obligation to Adjudicate Petitions for Same-Sex 
Divorce and the Dissolution of Civil Unions and Analogous Same-Sex Relationships: 
Prolegomenon to a Brief, 41 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 229, 231 (2010) (arguing that the combination 
of cases creating a right to divorce and requiring full faith and credit result in a constitutional 
right to same-sex divorce); Joslin, supra note 5, at 1710, 1716–17 (arguing for the abandonment 
of the domicile rule in divorce cases and suggesting that states “could amend their long-arm 
statutes” to create personal jurisdiction over parties who marry within the state as well as require 
parties marrying there “to consent to jurisdiction in the state for purposes of a subsequent 
divorce of that marriage”); Herma Hill Kay, Same-Sex Divorce in the Conflict of Laws, 15 
KINGS C. L.J. 63, 64, 84–85 (2004) (arguing, from a conflicts of law perspective, for legislation 
in states that permit same-sex marriage to eliminate residency requirements for same-sex 
divorce, as well as for recognition of divorce decrees entered in those states under an “incidents 
of marriage” approach, and positing that constitutional objections “may exist” to courts refusing 
to provide its citizens with access to the courts, specifically the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause and the Equal Protection Clause); Colleen McNichols Ramais, Note, ‘Til Death Do You 
Part . . . And This Time We Mean it: Denial of Access to Divorce for Same-Sex Couples, 2010 
U. ILL. L. REV. 1013, 1043 (arguing that Boddie v. Connecticut and the right to interstate travel 
require states to grant same-sex divorces, even for civil unions and domestic partnerships). 
23 A few other commentators have proposed practical solutions to the same-sex divorce 
issue. See, e.g., F. H. Buckley & Larry E. Ribstein, Calling a Truce in the Marriage Wars, 2001 
U. ILL. L. REV. 561, 592–98 (arguing that courts should recognize the “contractual” elements of 
same-sex marriages, including divorce, but not more general government benefits); John M. 
Yarwood, Breaking Up is Hard to Do: Mini-DOMA States, Migratory Same-Sex Marriage, 
Divorce, and a Practical Solution to Property Division, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1355, 138796 (2009) 
(arguing for adoption of the American Law Institute’s Principles of Family Dissolution or, in the 
alternative, treating same-sex divorce petitions like claims for property dissolution by opposite-
sex cohabitating partners); Danielle Johnson, Comment, Same-Sex Divorce Jurisdiction: A 
Critical Analysis of Chambers v. Ormiston and Why Divorce is an Incident of Marriage that 
Should be Uniformly Recognized Throughout the States, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 225, 233 
(2010) (arguing that courts could, following an “incidents of marriage” approach, grant same-
sex divorces without recognizing the marriage for other purposes). 
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Part I of this Article traces the evolution of divorce law in the 
United States. Although a divorce was initially impossible or very 
difficult to obtain, states began permitting couples to divorce under a 
variety of circumstances early in our nation’s history. Divorce laws 
varied widely from state to state, and pressure to enact more stringent 
divorce laws arose during the late 1800s and early 1900s. Yet by the 
1970s, no-fault divorce became the norm, and until the last decade, 
courts granted divorces liberally, even ex parte. That trend has 
shifted, however, with states now refusing to grant certain divorces—
namely, those of same-sex couples. 
Part II argues that granting same-sex couples the right to divorce, 
including the right to access the courts, is both morally proper and 
avoids constitutional concerns. Divorce should be permitted, from a 
normative standpoint, for four main reasons. First, personal autonomy 
suggests that states should not compel adults to remain married when 
they no longer desire that relationship. Second, under the view that 
marriage is, at least in some respects, a contractual relationship, 
parties ought to be able to decide jointly that they no longer wish to 
remain bound. Third, a number of legal obligations result from the 
marriage, and refusing to permit divorce requires the parties to remain 
liable for each other’s debts and torts, as well as to each other for 
support. Finally, the right to remarry requires parties be able to 
divorce, lest the state create bigamists or prevent marriages that they 
would otherwise support.  
Furthermore, principles of constitutional avoidance suggest that 
states ought to respect the liberty interests of their citizens with regard 
to the most basic familial relationships and permit divorce to avoid 
conflicts with the Due Process Clause. Due process also requires 
governments to provide citizens with an opportunity to litigate their 
legitimate disputes. States do have legitimate interests in regulating 
marriage, including divorce. But completely denying divorce to a 
segment of the married population arguably violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  
Finally, this Article concludes that because divorce should be 
permitted generally, and because divorce is fundamentally different 
from marriage in that it terminates the familial relationship rather than 
creates one, states ought to grant same-sex divorces despite their 
interest in refusing to grant or generally recognize same-sex 
marriages.24  
                                                                                                                  
24 This Article does not address claims based on the Full Faith and Credit Clause, either 
by requiring states to give full faith and credit to the marriage or by requiring other states to 
recognize the divorce, as contemplated by Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 303 
(1942). Similarly, it does not address restrictions on interstate travel, see, e.g., Andrew 
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I. THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN DIVORCE LAW AND COURTS’ 
REFUSAL TO GRANT DIVORCES 
State action is required in order for a couple to lawfully terminate 
their marriage.25 Despite the existence of common law marriage,26 
there is no corresponding common law divorce.27 Early American 
courts refused to grant divorces on policy grounds. Once divorces 
became available, the grounds on which they were granted were very 
limited. Finally, in the late 1960s, no-fault divorce emerged and any 
interested party could obtain a divorce essentially at will.28 That 
ability remained for over forty years, but with the advent of same-sex 
marriage, courts began to retreat from making divorce readily 
available, at least in those cases.  
A. From “No Divorce” to “No-Fault” Divorce 
In early colonial times, divorce was difficult to obtain.29 Following 
independence, state laws varied widely.30 Some states banned 
divorces outright, and, of those that granted divorces, the more strict 
states, such as New York, permitted divorce only in cases of 
                                                                                                                  
 
Koppelman, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages and Civil Unions: A Handbook for 
Judges, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2143, 2162 (2005) (discussing the constitutional right to interstate 
travel and its implications for same-sex marriages), or potential violations of the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause, see, e.g., Kay, supra note 22, at 84–85 (noting that the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause could require states to extend access to their courts to same-sex couples). 
Those claims have some merit, but the constitutional concerns raised in this Article are in 
addition to those other constitutional claims. 
Finally, the arguments made here apply to both “migratory” marriages—marriages where 
the parties lawfully marry in the state where they reside, but later move to a state that would not 
have permitted the marriage—as well as “evasive” marriages—marriages where the parties 
explicitly travelled to a state that permits them to be married although their home state does not. 
For a discussion on the differences between migratory marriages and evasive marriages, see 
KOPPELMAN, supra note 19, at 102–10.  
25 See, e.g., Ryan v. Ryan, 277 So.2d 266, 274 (Fla. 1973) (stating that “the matter of 
divorce is a legislative prerogative”); Young v. Young, 178 S.W.2d 994, 997 (Ark. 1944) 
(acknowledging that divorce is a province of states, and specifically of state legislatures).  
26 As of 2009, “fifteen states and the District of Columbia recognize[d] common law 
marriage under some circumstances.” Jennifer Thomas, Comment, Common Law Marriage, 22 
J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 151, 151 (2009). 
27 See Peter Nicolas, Essay, Common Law Same-Sex Marriage, 43 CONN. L. REV. 931, 
934 (2011) (noting that there is “no equally informal exit option, such as ‘common law 
divorce’”). 
28 For a good historical account of divorce in American, see Joanna L. Grossman, Fear 
and Loathing in Massachusetts: Same-Sex Marriage and Some Lessons from the History of 
Marriage and Divorce, 14 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 87, 89–100 (2004).  
29 Id. at 89. Grossman noted that the colonies “followed England’s ‘divorceless’ 
tradition.” Id. And although “[l]egislative divorce was sometimes available,” that practice was 
abolished in the latter half of the 1800s. Id. at 89 n.11.  
30 Id. at 90.  
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adultery.31 Other states, such as California, permitted divorce for a 
number of reasons, including “neglect.”32 
In the late 1800s and early 1900s, in response to an increase in 
divorce rates and to what were perceived as “liberal” divorce laws in 
some jurisdictions, a number of states tightened their standards for 
obtaining a divorce.33 Furthermore, a number of federal constitutional 
amendments were proposed between 1884 and the late 1940s that 
would have authorized Congress to regulate both marriage and 
divorce.34 In the wake of those failed amendments, changing societal 
attitudes, and continually increasing divorce rates, consensual 
divorces became more available, despite laws that on their face 
precluded them.35 
Finally, in the late 1960s, legal reform caught up to reality. 
California adopted the first no-fault divorce law,36 and the once-strict 
New York amended its laws to permit more divorces.37 The advent of 
no-fault divorce, which allowed a party seeking to end his or her 
marriage to do so without having to prove marital misconduct,38 was 
perceived as a “revolution.”39 Despite this revolution, residency 
requirements, which required at least one of the parties to reside in the 
state for a period of time prior to filing a petition for dissolution, 
minimized migratory divorces.40 And many states still offered 
                                                                                                                  
31 Id. States in the South tended to be more restrictive, and South Carolina prohibited 
divorces entirely. Id. at 89–90. 
32 Id. at 90. Some states permitted divorce on vague grounds, such as Connecticut, which 
allowed divorce for “misconduct”—meaning “any act that permanently destroys the happiness 
of the petitioner and defeats the purpose of the marriage relation.” Id. at 91 (citation and 
quotations omitted). This view was consistent with that of the pragmatists, who believed more 
lenient divorce laws were “favourable to the virtue and happiness of mankind.” Id. at 90 
(citation and quotation omitted). 
33 Ann Laquer Estin, Family Law Federalism: Divorce and the Constitution, 16 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 381, 390 (2007).  
34 Id.  
35 Id. at 395, 404. Even ex parte divorces were approved as early as 1942. See Williams v. 
North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 302–04 (1942) (holding that a Nevada divorce was entitled to full 
faith and credit in North Carolina, even though the divorce would violate North Carolina’s 
public policy). 
36 Lynn D. Wardle, No Fault Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum, 1991 BYU L. REV. 
79, 83. 
37 Estin, supra note 33, at 406. For a comprehensive discussion of grounds of divorce 
during the 1960s, see CLARK, supra note 4, at 327–58. 
38 See Ira Mark Ellman & Sharon Lohr, Marriage as Contract, Opportunistic Violence, 
and Other Bad Arguments for Fault Divorce, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 719, 722–23 (outlining the 
different permutations of no-fault divorce in the United States). 
39 See, e.g., JACOB, supra note 3, at 43–79 (describing the origination of no-fault divorce, 
and noting that while it was revolutionary, revision was accomplished rather peacefully); see 
also MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW, AND 
FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 188–90 (1989) (describing the variety 
of original no-fault statutes).  
40 See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 410 (1975) (upholding a one year residency 
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statutory grounds for divorce, often with ramifications for property 
division.41 But within fifteen years every state in the nation had 
adopted some form of no-fault divorce,42 and the United States 
Supreme Court made clear that due process required a “meaningful 
opportunity to be heard” for those seeking a divorce.43  
Many viewed this revolution as a transformation from marriage as 
a “status”44 to treating the marital relationship like a “contract.”45 By 
recognizing more of the contractual elements of marriage, no-fault 
divorce permitted more personal decision making.46 And most 
                                                                                                                  
 
requirement as a prerequisite to a court’s jurisdiction over a divorce). 
41 See, e.g., Copeland v. Copeland, 616 S.W.2d 773, 774–75 (Ark. Ct. App. 1981) 
(requiring the complaining spouse to not only prove the alleged statutory ground of “personal 
indignities” but also requiring, per the statute, that the complaining spouse’s testimony be 
corroborated by another witness to be considered).  
42 See JACOB, supra note 3, at 59, 80 (noting California’s law, the first no-fault divorce 
regime, became effective in 1970 and by 1985 the last holdout, South Dakota, joined the rest of 
the states and enacted a no-fault divorce regime); Ellman & Lohr, supra note 38, at 722 
(discussing the repudiation of classic “full-fault” divorce “in every American state by the late 
1970s”); Jane C. Murphy, Rules, Responsibility and Commitment to Children: The New 
Language of Morality in Family Law, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 1111, 1154 (1999) (explaining that by 
1985 no-fault divorce was available in every state). Challenges to this no-fault regime were 
generally unsuccessful. See, e.g., Ryan v. Ryan, 277 So.2d 266, 274 (Fla. 1973) (rejecting a 
number of constitutional challenges to Florida’s no-fault divorce law and noting “the matter of 
divorce is a legislative prerogative”).  
43 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377, 380–81 (1971) (invalidating a filing fee 
imposed on indigents petitioning for divorce). 
44 See, e.g., Janet Halley, Behind the Law of Marriage (I): From Status/Contract to the 
Marriage System, 6 UNBOUND: HARV. J. LEGAL LEFT 1, 3 (2010) (acknowledging that family 
law scholars tend to see marriage in these terms); Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced 
Homemaker: A Discourse on Playing with Dolls, Partnership Buyouts and Dissociation under 
No-Fault, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 67, 107 (1993) (arguing the “status” perspective, which was a 
“view of marriage as something more than a purely consensual relationship,” provided the 
“necessary basis for extensive state regulations”).  
45 See Starnes, supra note 44, at 107 (noting that the “new emphasis on individual 
fulfillment” was “at odds with extensive state regulation of marriage, and seemed especially 
inconsistent with fault-based divorce laws, which often limited individual choice”). In 1973, the 
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act adopted the “contract” view when it defined marriage as “a 
personal relationship between a man and a woman arising out of a civil contract to which the 
consent of the parties is essential.” UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 201, 9A U.L.A. 175 
(1998). Starnes noted that the Act defines the status of marriage as “arising out of . . . contract” 
and the drafters’ reference “to a partnership model for divorce” suggested a contract model. 
Starnes, supra note 44, at 108. Some scholars argue marriage inherently is and always was a 
contract, but its terms were not always enforced and remedies for breach were not always 
available. See Margaret F. Brinig & Steven M. Crafton, Marriage and Opportunism, 23 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 869, 873–83 (1994) (discussing marriage’s terms and conditions). 
Of course, marriage is neither entirely status nor entirely contract; in fact, the legal reality 
is that marriage bears elements of both, and that they operate on a continuum. The more status-
based marriage is, the more state control over the relationship. The more contract-based 
marriage is, the less state control. See, e.g., Halley, supra note 44, at 2 (noting that marriage has 
elements of both status and contract). 
46 See, e.g., Tracy A. Thomas, Elizabeth Cady Stanton on the Federal Marriage 
Amendment: A Letter to the President, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 137, 156–57 (2005) (stating that 
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scholars agreed that this was a welcome shift, especially in light of 
the gender imbalances present under more traditional marriage 
structures.47  
Even though the statutory requirements in no-fault jurisdictions 
must be proven, such as the “irretrievable breakdown of the 
marriage,”48 most states permit unilateral divorces.49 In the last two 
decades, some courts have granted divorces in cases where they 
would not have permitted the marriage in the first place, including 
common-law marriages50 and marriages of first cousins.51 Divorces 
have been permitted, primarily on equitable estoppel grounds, even 
                                                                                                                  
 
“the construct of marriage as a contract is clearly evidenced by the uniform acceptance of no-
fault divorce, prenuptial contracts, and separation agreements” and arguing that this “significant 
legal evolution” restricts “the government's ability to continue to control the marriage relation 
and its attendant privileges,” with the state being “divested of its power to restrict the individual 
freedoms and privileges of the partners choosing the marital relation”).  
47 See, e.g., Halley, supra note 44, at 15 (noting that “the onset of contractual freedom 
between spouses is seen as necessary for marriage to be free and equal”). Similarly, from the 
mid-1800s through the early 1900s, women in England were indicted for bigamy at a 
substantially higher rate than men, suggesting gender bias. Patricia Cohen, As the Gavels Fell: 
240 Years at Old Bailey, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2011, at C6.  
Some scholars, though, claim that this “triumph of contract over status” was a mistake, 
and that eliminating gender roles from the status rules would have been a better option. See, e.g., 
Ira Mark Ellman, “Contract Thinking” was Marvin’s Fatal Flaw, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1365, 1367 (2001) (arguing that “contract is a poor model for intimate relations”); see also 
Gaytri Kachroo, Mapping Alimony: From Status to Contract and Beyond, 5 PIERCE L. REV. 163, 
255 (2007) (arguing that “no-fault divorce makes the consequences of the ‘status’ legacy come 
to life” and these consequences are demonstrated in “the very real impact on women and 
children”). Critics of no-fault divorce, however, “have identified the move from status to 
contract as the underlying source of the problems with modern no-fault divorce law.” Elizabeth 
S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, A Contract Theory of Marriage, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM 
OF CONTRACT 201, 201 (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999).  
48 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Franks, 542 P.2d 845, 852 (Colo. 1975) (noting that 
“although the dissolution of marriage statute was intended as a ‘no-fault’ divorce act, the actual 
granting of the decree is not automatic or perfunctory under all circumstances” and requiring the 
court to “weigh all the evidence and make its own independent determination” of irretrievable 
breakdown). The Franks court went on to state that although Colorado’s no-fault divorce statute 
“did eliminate all the former defenses to divorce in this state, it did not eliminate the necessity 
of proving an irretrievable breakdown where that basic allegation is denied in the pleadings.” Id. 
49 See Ellman & Lohr, supra note 38, at 722–23 (and noting that in the few states that do 
not permit unilateral divorce, “spouses can divorce without any showing of fault if both of them 
consent”). 
50 See, e.g., Norman v. Ault, 695 S.E.2d 633, 635–36 (Ga. 2010) (granting a divorce from 
a common-law marriage entered into in Alabama despite the fact that Georgia does not allow 
common law marriages); Anderson v. Anderson, 577 So.2d 658, 660 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) 
(granting a divorce to a common-law marriage entered into in another jurisdiction). As of 2009, 
sixteen jurisdictions recognized common-law marriages. Thomas, supra note 26, at 151.  
51 See, e.g., Ghassemi v. Ghassemi, 998 So.2d 731, 742 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (recognizing 
a marriage between first cousins entered validly entered into in a foreign country in order to 
permit the parties to legally divorce); Cook v. Cook, 104 P.3d 857, 866 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005) 
(recognizing a marriage between first cousins validly entered into in another state); Mason v. 
Mason, 775 N.E.2d 706, 709–10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (same). 
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when the state’s strong public policy prohibits the underlying 
marriage, as in the case of bigamous marriages.52  
B. From “No-Fault” Divorce Back to “No Divorce”: The Case of 
Same-Sex Divorce Petitions 
Many scholars argue that American society is moving away from 
seeing marriage as a contract and back to seeing marriage as a status53 
that is “fundamental to the social order, a permanent commitment of 
the utmost importance, permeated by unshirkable obligation and 
public normativity.”54 The recent reintroduction of covenant 
marriages, essentially what existed at common law prior to no-fault 
divorce, is one attempt to return marriage to a more privileged status 
position.55 A movement to repeal no-fault divorce more generally is 
also gaining momentum.56 
                                                                                                                  
52 See, e.g., Heuer v. Heuer, 704 A.2d 913, 920 (N.J. 1998) (invoking quasi-estoppel to 
prevent a spouse from calling a bigamous marriage invalid in order to benefit financially); Poor 
v. Poor, 409 N.E.2d 758, 761–62 (Mass. 1980) (finding that a husband was estopped from 
challenging the validity of this wife’s prior divorce); McIntyre v. McIntyre, 191 S.E. 507, 507 
(N.C. 1937) (holding that one may not assert bigamy as a defense in divorce proceedings when 
the bigamy is due to the party’s failure to remedy an invalid divorce decree); Lowenschuss v. 
Lowenschuss, 579 A.2d 377, 386 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (holding that husband is estopped from 
asserting the marriage to be void due to wife’s divorce to a prior husband being procedurally 
invalid as a defense in divorce proceedings based on equitable principles); Mayer v. Mayer, 311 
S.E.2d 659, 669 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (same). Courts have granted a divorce even while 
acknowledging the bigamous nature of the marriage and the policies against marriage by 
estoppel. See, e.g., Farnham v. Farnham, 323 S.W.3d 129, 134 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) (granting 
a divorce to a wife, despite the marriage being “technically bigamous” and despite Tennessee’s 
policies against recognizing bigamist marriages or marriage by estoppel). 
Following similar principles in an estate case, a California court awarded half of the estate 
of an immigrant from India to each of his two wives, despite California law generally treating 
only the first wife as lawfully married and hence, the only person entitled to the estate. In re 
Estate of Singh Bir, 188 P.2d 499, 502 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948).  
53 See supra note 44 (citing sources that discuss marriage as a status). 
54 Halley, supra note 44, at 3 (“Marriage as status is conservative not only in the sense 
that it commits legal thought to using the institution to preserve tradition, but also in the sense 
that it provides an inlet into contemporary legal thought about marriage for classical legal 
ideas.”). Halley argues for an entirely new perspective, a “legal realist understanding of the 
marriage system,” because the “very idea that marriage is anything—anything at all—is 
symptomatically classical.” Id. 
55 See, e.g., Katherine Shaw Spaht, Mulieris Dignitatem: The Vocation of a Wife and 
Mother in a Legal Covenant Marriage, 8 AVE MARIA L. REV. 365, 366 (2010) (noting that in 
Louisiana, Arizona, and Arkansas, “a couple who chooses to marry may choose a covenant 
marriage, which consists of a legally enforceable agreement between the spouses to adopt a 
more binding form of marriage than available under typical ‘no-fault’ divorce statutes”); see 
also Caroline Bermeo Newcombe, The Origin and Civil Law Foundation of the Community 
Property System, Why California Adopted it, and Why Community Property Principles Benefit 
Women, 11 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 1, 13 (2011) (explaining that 
“[u]nlike a marriage based on ordinary contract law, a covenant marriage, at least under 
traditional common law, was supposed to be more permanent”). 
56 See, e.g., Ellman & Lohr, supra note 38, at 721 (discussing the movement to reinstitute 
fault divorce). 
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Yet even under a “fault” divorce scheme, parties can still obtain a 
divorce.57 They simply must claim one of the enumerated grounds.58 
Similarly, covenant marriages can be dissolved;59 the available 
grounds are fewer than under the current default provisions in most 
states,60 but the parties agree to those restrictions prior to entering into 
the marriage.61  
But a new class of cases has developed where courts simply refuse 
to consider petitions for divorce. Those cases involve petitions for 
divorce by same-sex couples lawfully married in another 
jurisdiction.62 The problem arises because of residency requirements. 
States do not impose residency requirements to be married.63 But all 
states impose residency requirements on a party seeking a divorce,64 
and moving to a state simply to obtain residency and file for divorce 
can also preclude jurisdiction.65 If the state where the parties reside 
                                                                                                                  
57 Id. at 722; see also Grossman, supra note 28, at 90 (noting that after the Revolutionary 
War, “[a]ll states required that an ‘innocent’ spouse file for divorce on one of the legislatively 
enumerated grounds”). 
58 Those grounds varied widely by jurisdiction. See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying 
text (discussing the previous fault schemes that existed in the states before the no-fault 
revolution). 
59 See, e.g., Scott & Scott, supra note 47, at 201 (noting that even in covenant marriages, 
spouses can terminate the marriage). 
60 See, e.g., Spaht, supra note 55, at 366 (citations omitted) (identifying the three 
“distinguishing features” of a covenant marriage as: “(1) mandatory premarital counseling by a 
member of the clergy or a professional marriage counselor; (2) an agreement to take reasonable 
steps to preserve the marriage if marital difficulties arise; and (3) limited grounds for divorce, 
ordinarily consisting of proof of a spouse’s fault or lengthened time periods of. [sic] living 
separate and apart”). 
61 See Stephen L. Nock et al., Covenant Marriage Turns Five Years Old, 10 MICH. J. 
GENDER & L. 169, 171 (2003) (noting that to enter into a covenant marriage, the parties must 
“participate in premarital counseling with a state-recognized secular or religious counselor” that 
explicitly covers “the restricted grounds for divorce”). Furthermore, the parties must present a 
Declaration of Intent to the clerk of the court “affirming that marriage is for life, that each 
partner has disclosed everything that could adversely affect the decision to marry, that 
premarital counseling was received, and the agreement to take all reasonable efforts to preserve 
the marriage, including marital counseling.” Id. 
62 In one of the first same-sex divorce cases filed, on March 3, 2003 a Texas judge 
“ordered a straightforward no-fault divorce decree and civil union dissolution.” Molly 
McDonough, Court Oks Divorce Without Recognizing ‘Marriage’: Gay Couple's Civil Union, 
Created in Vermont, Is Dissolved in Texas, Mar. 21, 2003, 2 No. 11 A.B.A. J. E.-REPORT 2 
(Westlaw) (noting that Texas district court judge Tom Mulvaney “made headlines” when he 
granted the same-sex divorce). The Texas Attorney General responded by requesting the judge 
set aside the decree, and although the judge agreed to rehear the case, the petition was ultimately 
withdrawn by the petitioners’ for financial reasons. Fred A. Bernstein, Gay Unions Were Only 
Half the Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2003, at ST2. 
63 See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text. 
64 CLARK, supra note 4, at 285–86. 
65 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 5 (West 2007) (emphasis added) (providing that 
“a divorce may be adjudged” as long as “the plaintiff has lived in this commonwealth for one 
year last preceding the commencement of the action if the cause occurred without the 
commonwealth, or if the plaintiff is domiciled within the commonwealth at the time of the 
commencement of the action and the cause occurred within the commonwealth,” “unless it 
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refuses to grant a divorce, the result is that no forum is in fact 
available and the parties must remain married. 
In these cases, the courts conclude that lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction prevents them from considering the merits of the case.66 
These decisions rely on statutory construction: divorce statutes permit 
courts to dissolve “marriages.” And most courts conclude that same-
sex unions, even if denoted “marriages” in the state where celebrated, 
are not “marriages” for purposes of their states’ divorce laws.  
In states with constitutional or statutory bans on same-sex 
marriage, the analysis is relatively straightforward. For example, a 
Texas Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court could not entertain a 
petition for same-sex divorce67 because Texas’s Constitution and 
statutes provided that marriage consisted “only of the union of one 
man and one woman.”68 Thus, the state was statutorily and 
constitutionally prohibited from giving effect to a same-sex marriage 
entered into elsewhere.69 Although the court was a court of general 
jurisdiction and could hear cases in law and equity,70 the “contrary 
showing” limiting the definition of marriage deprived the court of 
subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the petition.71 The court relied on 
language from a prior case asserting that “[a] Texas court has no more 
                                                                                                                  
 
appears that the plaintiff has removed into this commonwealth for the purpose of obtaining a 
divorce”). 
66 See infra notes 68–79 and accompanying text (discussing the reasoning behind courts’ 
refusal to grant same-sex divorces). Of course, if a court did accept jurisdiction, the judge could 
still deny the divorce on the merits. But because of no-fault divorce statutes, it would be very 
difficult, if not impossible, for a court to justify refusing to grant a divorce when the statutory 
basis of irreconcilable differences was present.  
67 In re J.B. & H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654, 659 (Tex. App. 2010) (dismissing a divorce petition 
by a same-sex couple married in Massachusetts for lack of jurisdiction and finding the Texas 
law mandating this result to be constitutional); but see State v. Naylor, 330 S.W.3d 434, 436 
(Tex. App. 2011) (holding the state lacked standing to appeal the grant of a divorce to a same-
sex couple married in Massachusetts), appeal filed No. 03–10–00237–CV (Tex. App. Apr. 23, 
2011). 
68 In re J.B. & H.B., 326 S.W.3d at 663. 
69 Id. at 663. Similarly, a Pennsylvania trial court held that the court was “without subject 
matter jurisdiction to grant a divorce” to a lesbian couple married in Massachusetts. Kern v. 
Taney, 11 Pa. D. & C. 558, 576 (Pa. Com. Pl. Mar. 15, 2010) (holding the court lacked 
jurisdiction over the case and refusing to find the Pennsylvania marriage law, which precluded 
their divorce, was unconstitutional). A Pennsylvania statute defined marriage as the union of 
one man and one woman, and another statute declared same-sex marriages entered into 
elsewhere were void. Id. at 562–63. “Without a legally recognizable marriage,” the court held, 
“relief under the Divorce Code is simply not available.” Id. at 563. The court recognized that the 
ruling meant the marriage remained valid in some jurisdictions. Id. at 576. The court further 
noted that although the plaintiff had no remedy under Pennsylvania’s divorce statutes, she could 
petition to have the marriage declared void. Id. It is questionable, however, whether that 
declaration would be binding in Massachusetts or any state that recognized same-sex marriages.  
70 In re J.B. & H.B., 326 S.W.3d at 664. 
71 Id. 
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power to issue a divorce decree for a same-sex marriage than it does 
to administer the estate of a living person.”72  
Even when the state constitution and statutes are silent in defining 
marriage, general principles of statutory construction can lead a court 
to conclude that divorce is not available to a same-sex couple.73 In the 
first appellate case in the country on this issue, the Supreme Court of 
Rhode Island ruled that the family court had no subject-matter 
jurisdiction to hear a petition for divorce filed by a party to a 
Massachusetts same-sex marriage.74 The family court was a court of 
limited jurisdiction,75 able to grant a divorce only if there was a valid 
marriage.76 The court held that, based on both the plain meaning of 
the word “marriage” and the legislative intent in 1961, when the 
divorce statutes were passed, only unions between opposite-sex 
couples were marriages.77  
Statutory language also led a New York trial court to dismiss a 
same-sex couple’s divorce petition for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction in 2006 where the couple married in Massachusetts.78 
                                                                                                                  
72 Id. at 666 (quoting Mireles v. Mireles, No. 01–08–00499–CV, 2009 WL 884815, at *2 
(Tex. App. Apr. 2, 2009) (setting aside a prior Texas divorce decree and declaring the marriage 
void because the former husband was born a biological female and hence, the underlying 
marriage was a void same-sex marriage)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
73 See Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956, 966 (R.I. 2007) (acknowledging the decision 
created a hardship by leaving the parties without a remedy, but declaring that the court was not a 
“policy-making branch” and any solution was up to the legislature).  
74 Id. at 967. The issue had been certified to the Rhode Island Supreme Court from the 
family court. 
75 Id. at 958. 
76 Id. at 959 n.6. 
77 Id. at 961–65. The same logic has been applied to civil unions. For instance, the 
Appellate Court of Connecticut refused to dissolve a Vermont same-sex civil union for lack of 
subject-matter jurisdiction. Rosengarten v. Downes, 802 A.2d 170, 184 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002). 
The court concluded that “the text itself, the rules of court, the legislative history, the strong 
legislative policy against permitting same sex marriages and the relationship between other 
statutes, legislative enactments of state policy and the common law” were consistent with 
finding a same-sex civil union was not a “marriage” for purposes of the divorce statutes. Id. at 
178. 
78 Gonzalez v. Green, 831 N.Y.S.2d 856, 861 (Sup. Ct. 2006) (declaring the marriage void 
and therefore dismissing the action for divorce, but permitting a claim based on a separation 
agreement to proceed). The court held that the same-sex marriage was void both under New 
York law as decided in Hernandez v. Robles, 805 N.Y.S.2d 354 (App. Div. 2005), and a 1913 
Massachusetts law that provided marriages by non-residents were void if they would be void in 
the state of residency. Gonzalez, 831 N.Y.S.2d at 858–59 (citation omitted). The court refused 
to invalidate the parties’ separation agreement, however, even though it expressly resolved their 
“property rights, and other rights and obligations growing out of the marriage relation.” 
Gonzalez, 831 N.Y.S.2d at 857, 859. 
In 2009, a New York court also ruled it had no power to grant a divorce to a same-sex 
couple who had entered a lawful civil union, despite prior New York courts granting same-sex 
divorces. B.S. v. F.B., 883 N.Y.S.2d 458, 463, 465–67 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009). The court 
recognized the same-sex Vermont civil union as “validly and properly contracted,” but refused 
to grant a divorce because the civil union did not constitute a “marriage.” Id. The court noted 
that the parties were New York residents and hence, were not able to pursue petition to dissolve 
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Similarly, an Oklahoma trial court, having entered a decree of 
dissolution and later learning that the parties to the Canadian marriage 
were both women, vacated its judgment.79 News reports of unreported 
decisions also suggest most courts are unwilling to grant same-sex 
couples a divorce when the state in which they live refuses to grant 
same-sex marriages.80  
A few courts, however, have considered petitions for same-sex 
divorce on the merits. For example, despite the state not permitting 
same-sex marriage at the time, some New York courts have 
recognized a same-sex marriage validly entered into in another 
jurisdiction for purposes of divorce.81 One New York court found that 
recognizing same-sex marriage was “consistent” with New York’s 
public policy.82 And in June 2011, the Wyoming Supreme Court ruled 
that Wyoming law permitted the state to grant a same-sex divorce.83 
                                                                                                                  
 
their civil union in Vermont, but the plaintiff “must be afforded a legal avenue to accomplish the 
fair and equitable dissolution of her fractured relationship with defendant.” Id. at 467. The court 
suggested she “may have a properly pleaded complaint for dissolution of the civil union heard 
by the New York State Supreme Court which possesses the general jurisdiction to hear and 
decide all equitable civil actions including actions which may also be heard by the Family 
Courts.” Id.  
79 See O’Darling v. O’Darling, 188 P.3d 137, 140 (Okla. 2008) (affirming in part the trial 
court’s order vacating the divorce decree). The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the trial 
court properly vacated its order because the petitioner failed to disclose that the parties were 
both women and failed to disclose “controlling legal authority regarding same-sex marriage in 
Oklahoma.” Id. at 139. The court also held that the court could not dismiss the divorce petition 
without notice to the petitioner, and that the trial court on remand should “conduct a hearing, 
after notice is given to the parties and the Oklahoma Attorney General’s office, allowing 
Petitioner to argue if there exists facts that would entitle her to relief.” Id. at 140. In light of the 
court’s holding that the order vacating the decree was proper, it is not clear what facts, other 
than the parties not actually both being women, would preclude dismissal of the petition.  
80 See, e.g., Associated Press, Neb. Judge Denies Divorce for Lesbian Couple, NEW ENG. 
CABLE NEWS (Feb. 6, 2011, 12:37 PM), http://www.necn.com/02/06/11/Neb-judge-denies-
divorce-for-lesbian-
cou/landing_politics.html?&blockID=3&apID=6184baa939174deba253933567a3e93e (stating 
District Judge Randall Rehmeier refused to grant a lesbian couple a divorce from a Vermont 
marriage, but did approve a custody agreement). 
81 C.M. v. C.C., 867 N.Y.S.2d 884, 889 (Sup. Ct. 2008) (holding the New York court had 
jurisdiction to grant a divorce to a same-sex couple married in Massachusetts); Beth R. v. Donna 
M., 853 N.Y.S.2d 501, 506 (Sup. Ct. 2008) (holding the court had jurisdiction to hear a divorce 
petition for a same-sex couple married in Canada); see also Martinez v. County of Monroe, 850 
N.Y.S.2d 740, 743 (App. Div. 2008) (recognizing, for benefits purposes, a same-sex Canadian 
marriage). 
82 C.M., 867 N.Y.S.2d at 887. 
83 Christiansen v. Christiansen, 253 P.3d 153, 157 (Wyo. 2011) (reversing a district 
court’s dismissal of a divorce petition resulting from a Canadian same-sex marriage and holding 
the Wyoming court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the case). The court reconciled the 
Wyoming statute that prohibited same-sex marriage with another Wyoming statute that provided 
“[a]ll marriage contracts which are valid by the laws of the country in which contracted are 
valid in this state.” Id. at 155–56 (alteration in original) (quotation omitted). 
In a bench ruling with no written opinion, a New Jersey trial court also granted a divorce 
on principles of comity to a lesbian couple married in Canada. Arthur S. Leonard, More on N.J. 
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The Wyoming court recognized that district courts have “broad 
subject-matter jurisdiction”84 and asserted that the policy exception 
precluding recognition of certain foreign marriages “is necessarily 
narrow.”85 It then concluded that: 
[R]ecognizing a valid foreign same-sex marriage for the 
limited purpose of entertaining a divorce proceeding does not 
lessen the law or policy in Wyoming against allowing the 
creation of same-sex marriages. A divorce proceeding does 
not involve recognition of a marriage as an ongoing 
relationship. Indeed, accepting that a valid marriage exists 
plays no role except as a condition precedent to granting a 
divorce. After the condition precedent is met, the laws 
regarding divorce apply. Laws regarding marriage play no 
role.86 
By petitioning for divorce to dissolve their marriage, which was 
legally entered into in Canada, the parties were “not seeking to live in 
Wyoming as a married couple,” and thus were “not seeking to enforce 
any right incident to the status of being married.”87 Respecting 
Canadian law for the “limited purpose of accepting the existence of a 
condition precedent to granting a divorce” was not, the court found, 
“tantamount to state recognition of an ongoing same-sex marriage. 
Thus, the policy of this state against the creation of same-sex 
marriages is not violated.”88 
This approach acknowledges what Texas courts, which have stated 
that a “Texas court has no more power to issue a divorce decree for a 
same-sex marriage than it does to administer the estate of a living 
person,”89 have ignored. No court could find a living person dead, 
                                                                                                                  
 
Marriage Recognition Ruling, LEONARD LINK (Feb. 25, 2009), 
http://newyorklawschool.typepad.com/leonardlink/2009/02/more-on-nj-marriage-recognition-
ruling.html. 
84 Christiansen, 253 P.3d at 155. 
85 Id. at 156. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 156–57. In response to this ruling, the president of an anti-same-sex marriage 
organization stated that she “will continue to encourage the Legislature to ‘correct’ the statutes 
and allow people to vote on the so-called ‘defense of marriage’ constitutional amendment.” 
Ashby Jones, Wyoming High Court Grants Divorce to Same-Sex Couple, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG 
(Jun. 7, 2011, 1:27 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/06/07/wyoming-high-court-grants-
divorce-to-same-sex-couple/. The Wyoming Supreme Court earlier denied a petition to 
intervene in the case filed by thirteen state legislators. Joan Barron, Wyoming Supreme Court 
Reverses Same-Sex Divorce Ruling, CASPER STAR-TRIBUNE (Jun. 7, 2011, 7:00 AM), 
http://trib.com/news/state-and-regional/article_56d136c9-ea3c-54c6-b5db-39bf9fb28a48.html. 
89 Mireles v. Mireles, No. 01–08–00499–CV, 2009 WL 884815, at *2 (Tex. App. Apr. 2, 
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making administration of a living person’s estate both completely 
impossible as well as unnecessary. But a court could find—and some 
have found——a same-sex couple married, making their divorce both 
possible and, when sought, necessary. 
II. THE RIGHT TO DIVORCE AND TO ACCESS THE COURTS 
The ability to divorce is important, and restricting individuals’ 
ability to divorce is morally problematic for a number of reasons. 
First, when a government forces a person to remain married to an 
individual who is no longer of his or her choosing, that person’s 
personal autonomy is significantly reduced. Second, the perspective 
that marriage is, at least in some sense, a contract rather than simply a 
status suggests that divorce cannot be prohibited. Third, married 
persons are often legally liable for their spouse’s actions, even absent 
consent, and courts should not shackle a person with unwanted and 
unintended liability. Finally, individuals cannot remarry if they 
remain legally married to another person.  
Furthermore, substantive due process suggests that individuals 
possess a protectable right to divorce. Despite state restrictions on the 
formation of a marriage, once a party is married, the state should be 
obligated to acquiesce in the dissolution of that marriage if and when 
the parties no longer desire to be married. 
A. Personal Autonomy and Dignity  
Whether or not marriage is viewed as a completely egalitarian 
relationship,90 the basic principles of individual autonomy91 dictate 
                                                                                                                  
 
2009), quoted in In re Marriage of J.B. & H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654, 666 (Tex. App. 2010). 
90 See Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Properties of Marriage, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 
75, 77 (2004) (arguing for a vision of marriage, as an “egalitarian liberal community,” which 
combines the benefits of community with equality and individual autonomy, protected through 
the right of free exit). 
91 “[R]espect for individual autonomy is a central principle of much of our ethical and 
political theory . . . .” Bruce J. Winick, Harnessing the Power of the Bet: Wagering with the 
Government as a Mechanism for Social and Individual Change, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 737, 765 
n.90 (1991); see also Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should be 
Overruled, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 381, 426 (1992) (describing “individual human dignity” as a 
“cardinal” belief in our “political culture” that “people have the moral right—and the moral 
responsibility—to confront for themselves, answering to their own conscience and conviction, 
the most fundamental questions touching the meaning and value of their own lives”); see 
generally IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 69 (Allen W. 
Wood ed. & trans., Yale Univ. Press 2002) (1785) (connecting freedom with autonomy and 
autonomy with morality); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 119–20, 127, 149–52 (Gertrude 
Himmelfarb ed., Penguin Books 1974) (1859) (arguing that the freedom to act on one’s opinions 
is an essential part of well-being). 
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that adults are entitled to make decisions about their most important 
relationships. Marriage is among the most important human 
relationships92—to decide with whom to live, maintain a household, 
and be intimate. When adults93 no longer desire to maintain the 
marital relationship, the law should not require them to remain legally 
entangled.94 Very little is required to marry; only a simple application 
and certification from the state is necessary.95 But judicial 
intervention is required to divorce,96 and the state should not 
eliminate access to that judicial process.97 
Marriage is a voluntary relationship.98 People cannot be forced 
into a marriage;99 similarly, they should not be compelled to remain 
married regardless of how deeply they desire to end it.100  
                                                                                                                  
92 See, e.g., Anne C. Dailey, Liberalism’s Ambivalence, 28 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 617, 617 
(2010) (noting that “in the realms of intimate relationships and spirituality,” we observe “the 
flowering of romantic ideas about individual freedom, self-expression, free love, spiritual 
transcendence, and the whole structure of ideas surrounding privacy and autonomy in modern 
liberal legal thought”); Mae Kuykendall, Emerson Family Values: Claims to Duration and 
Renewal in American Narratives of Divorce, Love and Marriage, 18 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 
69, 72 (2007) (describing marriage as “paradoxically both deeply private and important to the 
constitution of citizenship”); see also E. Christian Brugger, Book Review, 55 AM. J. JURIS. 225, 
231 (2010) (reviewing THE JURISPRUDENCE OF MARRIAGE AND OTHER INTIMATE 
RELATIONSHIPS (Scott FitzGibbon, Lynn D. Wardle & A. Scott Loveless eds., 2010)) 
(describing marriage, for Kant, as “a vehicle for personal autonomy—an expression of adult 
choice”). 
93 These same principles do not apply with respect to adults’ relationships with children or 
incapacitated individuals; in those instances, adults have a moral obligation to maintain the 
relationship for the benefit of those who need to be protected. In the marital context, however, 
the “disabilities” formerly placed upon women that would suggest an ongoing obligation to 
remain married no longer exist. See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 4, at 219, 222 (describing the limits 
the law historically placed on married women to do certain things without their husbands and 
those limits elimination). 
94 See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 91, at 426 (arguing that human dignity requires the right 
to decided issues of value for themselves); Rogers M. Smith, The Constitution and Autonomy, 
60 TEX. L. REV. 175, 177 (1982) (describing the “turn from liberty to autonomy” as reflecting 
“a shift from higher law views that justified the liberal state as the means of achieving a specific 
substantive goal, securing certain natural rights, to more relativistic stances that defend the state 
because it allows for the pursuit of self-chosen ends, now held to be the only ends that are 
legitimate”). 
95 See, e.g., Martha M. Ertman, Marriage as a Trade: Bridging the Private/Private 
Distinction, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 117–18 (2001) (discussing the minimal formalities 
required to form a marriage). 
96 See id. at 119–120 (discussing marital dissolutions and comparing them to 
administrative corporate dissolutions). 
97 Some scholars criticize autonomy as a governing legal principle. See, e.g., Martha 
Albertson Fineman, Evolving Images of Gender and Equality: A Feminist Journey, 43 NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 437, 437 (2009) (attributing the unequal treatment of women to our valuing 
“autonomy over equality,” thus sacrificing “substantive equality in the name of greater 
independence, ignoring the realities of our shared states of episodic dependency and constant 
vulnerability”). But few question its prominence. See, e.g., Mary Sigler, Private Prisons, Public 
Functions, and the Meaning of Punishment, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 149, 163 (2010) (noting the 
“ascendancy of the liberal commitment to autonomy and individual rights”). 
98 See, e.g., Garrison v. Garrison, 460 A.2d 945, 947 (Conn. 1983) (upholding the validity 
of a marriage in a dissolution proceeding because even though the parties did not intend to file 
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B. Marriage as a Contract  
The view that marriage is a contract also justifies the right to 
divorce.101 Just as parties can mutually decide to enter into an 
enforceable contract,102 parties to an existing contract can mutually 
decide to exit that contract and the law will support those agreements 
of rescission103 and release.104 Applying the contract theory to 
marriage,105 people have a right to decide the terms of their marriage, 
including when to end it.106  
                                                                                                                  
 
the marriage certificate, they did “intend to marry”); Tice v. Tice, 672 P.2d 1168, 1170–71 
(Okla. 1983) (“Marriage is a personal relation which arises from a civil contract, and which 
requires the voluntary consent of parties who have the legal capacity to contract.”); Aetna Life 
Ins. Co. v. Boober, 784 P.2d 186, 188–89 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (finding that a decedent’s wife 
was entitled to his life insurance proceeds despite their separation). The court in Boober 
acknowledged the general proposition that marriage “is based on mutual consent” and that 
“[e]ither party may withdraw consent by dissolving the marriage.” Boober, 784 P.2d at 188. 
“Plainly, spouses can best judge the viability of their marriage.” Id. 
99 Forced marriage is also banned by various international human rights conventions, such 
as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW). Jennifer Gong-Gershowitz, Forced Marriage: A “New” Crime Against Humanity?, 
8 NW J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 53, 66 (2009) (discussing the CEDAW’s proscription of forced 
marriages).  
100 Some argue that divorce is impossible because there is no “real marriage” in the first 
instance. See, e.g., Sherif Girgis et al., What is Marriage?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 245, 
246 (2011) (arguing for the “conjugal” view of marriage: “the union of a man and a woman who 
make a permanent and exclusive commitment to each other of the type that is naturally 
(inherently) fulfilled by bearing and rearing children together”). The authors claim that only 
opposite-sex marriage is “real marriage” because only heterosexual intercourse involves 
“organic bodily union.” Id. at 252–53.  
101 Interestingly, a contract that impairs the right to marry might be unenforceable as 
against public policy. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 189 (1981) (“A promise is 
unenforceable on grounds of public policy if it is unreasonably in restraint of marriage.”). 
Furthermore, a contract theory of marriage is consistent with personal autonomy. See, e.g., 
Nancy S. Kim, Reasonable Expectations in Sociocultural Context, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
641, 642 (2010) (explaining that contract law is not designed to enforce “societal standards or 
norms” and that contract law does not “force parties into contracts to which they have not 
agreed, even if those contracts would be socially beneficial”). Kim also noted that “[o]ne of the 
main objectives of contract law . . . is furthering personal autonomy—the ‘freedom to 
contract.’” Id. 
102 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 12 (1981) (providing that unless certain 
narrow incapacitating conditions are present, “[a] natural person who manifests assent to a 
transaction has full legal capacity to incur contractual duties thereby”). 
103 Id. § 283 (providing that an “agreement of rescission is an agreement under which each 
party agrees to discharge all of the other party’s remaining duties of performance under an 
existing contract”; furthermore, an “agreement of rescission discharges all remaining duties of 
performance of both parties”). 
104 Id. § 284 (providing “[a] release is a writing providing that a duty owed to the maker of 
the release is discharged immediately or on the occurrence of a condition” and that the release 
“takes effect on delivery”). 
105 As noted earlier, marriage in America is not truly a purely contractual matter; it has 
elements of both status and contract. See supra notes 44–47 and accompanying text. And the 
view of marriage as both a status and a contract has persisted since at least 1932. K.N. 
Llewellyn, Behind the Law of Divorce: I, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 1281, 1282 (1932) (noting that the 
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Although courts and commentators have recognized marriage as a 
contract for over a hundred years,107 treating marriage like a contract, 
albeit a state-approved and regulated contract, began during the rise 
of no-fault divorce.108 Removing the vestiges of coverture109 and 
attempts to liberate women from the gender-rigid roles present in 
traditional marriages110 resulted in a shift toward allowing married 
couples to create their own terms and conditions regarding at least 
some aspects of the marital relationship.111  
By analogy, partnerships are also mutual agreements that establish 
a legally enforceable relationship,112 and formation brings particular 
                                                                                                                  
 
“law-books tell us of marriage as a ‘contract’ . . . and marriage as a ‘status’”). But to the extent 
those contractual elements have grown over the past 200 years, they inform this argument. And 
“the contractual nature of the modern law of marriage is indisputable” because of the “freedom 
of parties to opt out of the state-provided legal rules.” Scott & Scott, supra note 47, at 236.  
106 Although marriage is a social contract as well as a personal contract between the 
parties, the rise of the contract theory of marriage corresponded with the rise in respecting 
individual rights. See Estin, supra note 33, at 383 (discussing the intersection between the rise in 
individual rights and the revolution in divorce law). 
Henry Sumner Maine posited in the 1800s that law was moving to a contract theory, 
proclaiming that “the movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from 
Status to Contract.” HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE 
EARLY HISTORY OF SOCIETY, AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 165 (Ashley Montagu ed., 
Univ. Ariz. Press 1986) (1864).  
If marriage is treated like a contract, the ban on specific enforcement of personal services 
contracts is arguably relevant. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 367(1) (1981) (“A 
promise to render personal service will not be specifically enforced.”). Under that provision, the 
courts could not force an unwilling party to remain married; “damages” may be proper, but the 
party would be entitled to exit the marriage. 
107 See, e.g., Ponder ex rel. Graham v. Graham, 4 Fla. 23, 44 (1851) (declaring 
unconstitutional a legislative act declaring a particular marriage dissolved because it impaired 
“the obligation of a contract”); Franklin G. Fessenden, Nullity of Marriage, 13 HARV. L. REV. 
110, 110 (1899) (acknowledging that whether “marriage is looked upon as a contract or as an 
institution or as a status, it is perhaps the most important of all conditions in civilized 
communities” and arguing the parties to a marriage have no power to dissolve the marriage 
contract). 
108 See supra notes 44–47 and accompanying text (discussing the shift from thinking about 
marriage as a status to marriage as a contract).    
109 “Coverture is the legal system that vested virtually all property rights to a couple’s 
assets in the husband.” Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Theory of Alimony, 
82 GEO. L.J. 2227, 2230 n.5 (1994). Williams argued that the current post-divorce 
impoverishment of women and children results from treating men’s income as “entitlements” 
under property law, allocating the “family wealth to husbands,” and treating women’s claims to 
income under family law as a “discretionary redistribution.” Id. at 2229. 
110 See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 46, at 156 (discussing how recognition of women’s 
individual liberties helped form the current terms of legal marriage). 
111 See, e.g., Ellen Kandoian, Cohabitation, Common Law Marriage, and the Possibility of 
a Shared Moral Life, 75 GEO. L.J. 1829, 1833 (1987) (noting that although the “status model 
views marriage as defining and modifying . . . the identities of the marriage partners,” the 
“contract model . . . conceptualizes marriage in terms of a series of rights and duties undertaken 
by consent”).  
112 See Calvin G. C. Pang, Slow-Baked, Flash-Fried, Not to be Devoured: Development of 
the Partnership Model of Property Division in Hawai‘i and Beyond, 20 U. HAW. L. REV. 1, 5 
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legal and social consequences. Yet when business partners no longer 
desire to remain entangled, the state does not object to the dissolution 
of their partnership.113 True, the dissolution cannot be for the purpose 
of evading creditors or for other fraudulent reasons.114 But the 
legitimate desire to end the business relationship is sufficient for the 
law to permit that dissolution.115 
The rise in judicial enforcement of prenuptial and postnuptial 
agreements is consistent with viewing marriage from this 
perspective.116 Although American courts previously refused to 
enforce such agreements117—either for lack of capacity118 or as 
against public policy119—courts now generally recognize married 
                                                                                                                  
 
(1998) (“Analogizing marriage to a partnership, more specifically a commercial partnership, 
was a legal construct largely necessitated by a nationwide turn toward no-fault divorces.”); 
Cynthia M. Davis, Comment, “The Great Divorce” of Government and Marriage: Changing 
the Nature of the Gay Marriage Debate, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 795, 803 (2006) (internal citation 
omitted) (analogizing marriage to a closely-held corporation, “especially concerning formation,” 
which “‘requires application to and certification from the state’”); see also Laura W. Morgan & 
Edward S. Snyder, When Title Matters: Transmutation and the Joint Title Gift Presumption, 18 
J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 335, 336 n.3 (2003) (“The theory of marriage as partnership 
completely suffuses divorce law.”). 
113 With a true “partnership,” no judicial approval is even necessary, making it more 
similar to cohabitation than marriage. Davis, supra note 112, at 804. But for corporations 
seeking to dissolve, they must file formal “articles of dissolution.” Id. at 803. They can dissolve 
voluntarily, which Davis analogizes to no-fault divorce, or administratively. Id.; see also 
Ertman, supra note 95, at 118–19 (analogizing corporate dissolutions to divorce). 
114 See, e.g., Ann E. Conaway Stilson, Reexaming the Fiduciary Paradigm at Corporate 
Insolvency and Dissolution: Defining Directors Duties to Creditors, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 11, 
n.32 (1995) (discussing the dissolution incentive created when corporations can evade creditors 
through dissolution). 
115 See, e.g., Robert B. Thompson, Corporate Dissolution and Share Holders’ Reasonable 
Expectations, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 193, 199 (1988) (stating that corporations statutes permit 
“voluntary dissolution” as well as providing methods for involuntary dissolution, such as 
“dissolution on deadlock; dissolution for misconduct by those in control of the corporation; and 
dissolution on broader grounds not necessarily related to misconduct”).  
116 See, e.g., Scott & Scott, supra note 47, at 203–04 (noting that the “contractual paradigm 
is most evident in marital dissolution proceedings,” where the parties’ “separation and 
premarital agreements” are routinely enforced by courts). 
117 See, e.g., Sarah Ann Smith, The Unique Agreements: Premarital and Marital 
Agreements, Their Impact Upon Estate Planning, and Proposed Solutions to Problems Arising 
at Death, 28 IDAHO L. REV. 833, 840 (1991–1992) (noting early American courts’ refusal to 
accept pre- and post-marital agreements). Some early courts, however, enforced prenuptial 
agreements in equity, even though they were void under law. See, e.g., Tisdale v. Jones, 38 
Barb. 523, 525 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1860) (“It cannot be doubted at this day that a contract entered 
into between husband and wife before marriage, although void at law, will be recognized and 
enforced in equity.”). 
118 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 117, at 840 (noting that until the mid-nineteenth century, a 
woman’s legal identity merged with that of her husband).  
119 Many courts refused to enforce support obligations in prenuptial agreements under the 
view that those agreements were “destabilizing to the marital relationship and might promote or 
encourage marital breakup.” Edwardson v. Edwardson, 798 S.W.2d 941, 943 (Ky. 1990); see 
also Smith, supra note 117, at 840–41 (discussing courts’ policy rationale behind voiding 
certain prenuptial agreements). 
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couples’ right to control the parameters of their marital relationship 
with these types of agreements.120 Similarly, divorce law itself 
supports the contractual nature of marriage; consensual settlement 
agreements are “particularly favored” in divorce cases.121 
By “allowing spouses to enter into stronger commitments than the 
state’s default contract provides for,”122 the view that marriage is a 
contract is consistent with communitarian goals.123 Similarly, the 
return to offering covenant marriage options in some states,124 despite 
being an attempt to return marriage to a privileged status,125 has been 
described as a “milestone” in the “evolution of marriage from a 
relationship based on status to one that is regulated by contractual 
norms.”126 Allowing the parties entering into a marriage to jointly 
determine the standards by which they can divorce preserves their 
right to contract, while at the same time allowing them to “voluntarily 
undertake a greater marital commitment” than no-fault divorce 
requires.127 
C. Legal Liability 
The law imposes legal liability for one’s spouse.128 For example, 
married parties are obligated to each other for support.129 And despite 
                                                                                                                  
120 See, e.g., Williams v. Williams, 801 P.2d 495, 497, 499 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) 
(overruling a 1926 case that held prenuptial agreements could not waive spousal maintenance); 
Edwardson, 798 S.W.2d at 945 (overruling a 1916 case that declared prenuptial agreements 
void); see also Homer H. Clark, Jr., Antenuptial Contracts, 50 U. COLO. L. REV. 141, 142 
(1979) (explaining that antenuptial contracts are valid and enforceable if they comply with 
contract law); Smith, supra note 117, at 840–43 (tracing the history of prenuptial agreements). 
Courts have also been willing to find and enforce oral agreements of property division and 
support, even in the absence of a lawful marriage, unless the sole basis for the agreement is 
illicit sexual services. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 116 (Cal. 1976).  
121 See Weishaus v. Weishaus, 849 A.2d 171, 178 (N.J. 2004) (citation omitted) (noting 
that “while settlement is an encouraged mode of resolving cases generally, ‘the use of 
consensual agreements to resolve marital controversies’ is particularly favored in divorce 
matters”); accord Dougan v. Dougan, 21 A.3d 791, 796 (Conn. 2011) (citation and quotations 
omitted) (noting that a stipulated judgment in a dissolution “may be defined as a contract of the 
parties acknowledged in open court and ordered to be recorded by a court of competent 
jurisdiction”). 
122 Sean Hannon Williams, Postnuptial Agreements, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 827, 878.  
123 See, e.g., id. (arguing that, “[f]ar from undermining communitarian values, the language 
of contract . . . is consistent with the language of commitment and obligation”); Scott & Scott, 
supra note 47, at 208 (arguing that “contract can serve very well as a basis for an enduring, 
committed relationship”); see also Clark, supra note 120, at 142 (emphasis added) (stating that 
“if certain requirements of form and substance are met, the typical antenuptial contract is valid 
and enforceable and in fact is favored by the law as tending to promote marital harmony”). 
124 Under a covenant marriage, divorce can be granted only for fault, or, absent marital 
fault, after a long waiting period. Nock et al., supra note 61, at 172.  
125 See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
126 Scott & Scott, supra note 47, at 201. 
127 Id. 
128 See, e.g., Ertman, supra note 95, at 117 (observing that spouses are often liable for 
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not jointly entering into a commercial contract, spouses can be liable 
for each other’s debts, at least for “necessaries”130 and under “family 
expense” statutes.131 In community property states, this problem is 
exacerbated.132 Spouses can also be liable in tort under the family 
purpose doctrine.133 Insurance laws remove some of these 
concerns,134 but for uninsured parties and torts not covered by 
mandatory liability insurance, the innocent spouse remains subject to 
tort liability.135  
As long as spouses remain legally married, they could be subject 
to liability for each other’s actions136—even though they may 
desperately desire to be freed from that legal obligation. Parties who 
no longer share a committed emotional bond are less likely to be 
                                                                                                                  
 
debts incurred by their partner); Marie T. Reilly, In Good Times and In Debt: The Evolution of 
Marital Agency and the Meaning of Marriage, 87 NEB. L. REV. 373, 399 (2008) (noting that 
“[e]ven though divorce law reconstructs marriage as a contract at the will of the parties, marital 
status—the fact that two people are married—triggers shared financial responsibility to third 
parties without regard to the parties’ private agreement”). 
129 See, e.g., Beth R. v. Donna M., 853 N.Y.S.2d 501, 509 (Sup. Ct. 2008) (noting that 
because the two women were married, “Plaintiff may be constrained to provide support for 
Defendant and Defendant would be a recipient of a portion of Plaintiff’s estate”); Pang, supra 
note 112, at 39–40 (recounting one state’s statutory “transform[ation]” of the “duty for the 
husband to support his wife . . . into a duty by both spouses to support each other and their 
family”); Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Interstate Recognition of Lesbigay Adoptions, 
3 AVE MARIA L. REV. 561, 591 (2005) (observing that marriage and adoption create legal and 
familial ties that previously did not exist). 
130 Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 838 (2004) (“[A]t 
least thirty-three states recognize some form of the doctrine of necessaries. Under this doctrine, 
spouses are prohibited from suing each other directly for support, but are obligated to pay each 
other’s debts, if the debts are for necessary expenses.”); see also James L. Musselman, Once 
Upon a Time in Bankruptcy Court: Sorting Out Liability of Marital Property for Marital Debt is 
No Fairy Tale, 41 FAM. L.Q. 249, 251 (2007) (explaining that a spouse is liable for debts 
incurred by their partner for items purchased for family use). Furthermore, a creditor’s rights 
relating to existing debts are not affected by a divorce decree; however, post-divorce, the 
spouses are no longer legally liable for each other’s debts. Id. at 259–60.  
131 Reilly, supra note 128, at 399–400, 400 n.116 (describing statutes which establish a list 
of goods for which the non-contracting spouse is liable if the contracting spouse fails to pay). 
132 See William Houston Brown, 1 THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS § 6:85 (2011) 
(explaining that in some states, creditors may pursue community property for separate debts, 
and at times creditors may pursue separate property to satisfy community debts); Reilly, supra 
note 128, at 400–01 (explaining that in some community property states creditors may collect 
debts from either spouse if the spouse has the right to control). 
133 See, e.g., Reilly, supra note 128, at 400 (describing “the ‘family purpose doctrine’ by 
which courts imposed one family member’s tort liability on other solvent family members based 
on family activities as joint enterprise”).  
134 See id. (noting that the presence of mandatory automobile insurance laws addresses the 
problem of driver insolvency). 
135 See 8 AM. JUR. 2D Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 714 (2007) (noting that while 
the mere familial relationship generally is not enough to establish liability, when a husband and 
wife are engaged in a “joint enterprise,” liability of the driver may be imputed to the third 
party). 
136 See supra notes 128–35 and accompanying text. 
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concerned for each other’s financial well-being,137 creating an 
incentive for abuse. Divorce law intends to resolve this problem by 
severing these legal bonds: “The primary effect to be accomplished 
by a divorce or dissolution is the separation of the parties in a manner 
that enables each to continue his or her life as free as possible from 
entanglement with the other.”138 The absence of any forum for same-
sex couples to obtain a divorce prevents divorce law from fulfilling 
this goal. 
Although it is true that some states may not impose liability upon 
the “spouses” they refuse to divorce—because they do not view them 
as married in the first place139—creditors with access to marriage 
records may claim detrimental reliance or make a similar equitable 
argument.140 In addition, if one spouse moves to a state that does 
recognize the marriage, whether to establish residency in order to 
obtain a divorce or for other purposes, that spouse is very likely 
subject to liability for the other spouse’s actions. 
D. The Right to Remarry 
The right to marry includes the right to remarry, and that right 
depends on the ability to divorce. Every state prohibits bigamous 
marriages,141 yet without the ability to dissolve an existing marriage, 
the parties cannot exercise their right to remarry142 without 
                                                                                                                  
137 See Yuval Feldman & Shahar Lifshitz, Behind the Veil of Legal Uncertainty, 74 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 133, 161 (2011) (noting that one characteristic of involvement is concern for 
a spouses financial well-being). 
138 Ward v. Ward, 599 P.2d 1150, 1153 (Or. Ct. App. 1979) (terminating an alimony award 
because the former wife had gained employment and acknowledging the husband was “not a 
life-long guarantor of a higher standard of living”). 
139 Ostensibly, just as a court could refuse to grant a divorce, a court could also reject a 
creditor’s claim of spousal liability. The rationale would not likely be lack of jurisdiction, see 
supra Part I.B, but would be simply lack of liability for want of a valid marriage. 
140 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981). Creditors arguably have a right 
to rely on valid marriage records. Furthermore, it would be difficult for spouses to argue that 
when they entered into the marriage relationship they did not intend to hold themselves out as 
married or accept the benefits and responsibilities that came with marriage. 
141 See, e.g., Diane J. Klein, Plural Marriage and Community Property Law, 41 GOLDEN 
GATE U. L. REV. 33, 35 (2010) (noting that “[b]igamy is currently illegal in every state” and is 
prohibited “by the state constitutions of five states”). 
142 For purposes of this Article, we can presume the party seeking a same-sex divorce 
wishes to remarry an opposite-sex partner, eliminating any debate about whether the right to the 
subsequent marriage is a fundamental right. 
Some scholars have argued that all state-sponsored marriage could cease to exist, 
obviating the need for divorce. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED 
MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 228 (1995) 
(arguing society should not consider marriage to be a “legal category”); Anita Bernstein, For 
and Against Marriage: A Revision, 102 MICH. L. REV. 129, 166–191 (2003) (reviewing 
arguments against continued state recognition of marriage); Patricia A. Cain, Imagine There’s 
No Marriage, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 27, 28 (1996) (analyzing the potential legal and social 
 4/12/2012 11:09:23 AM 
2011] THE RIGHT TO (SAME-SEX) DIVORCE 473 
committing bigamy.143 And because marriage is a fundamental 
right,144 denying the ability to divorce is, in essence, denying the 
ability to exercise this fundamental right.145 
States are free to impose some restrictions on divorce. For 
example, compulsory mediation,146 aimed to reduce the overall 
divorce rates and aid the societal goal in having couples remain 
married, may be proper. Similarly, residency requirements demanding 
a plaintiff reside in the state for a set period of time prior to 
commencing a divorce action are a reasonable means to avoid 
migratory divorces.147 But states must provide some ability for their 
residents to obtain a divorce.148 
                                                                                                                  
 
consequences of the abolition of state recognition of marriage); Dianne Post, Why Marriage 
Should Be Abolished, 18 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 283, 283 (1997) (arguing for the abolition of 
marriage). Because marriage is firmly entrenched as a fundamental right, it is questionable 
whether eliminating state recognition would survive constitutional scrutiny. See infra note 144.  
143 A recent symposium on family law posed this very hypothetical in the context of a 
California same-sex couple who lawfully married there. Jennifer Ann Drobac, Jazzing up 
Family Law: The First Annual Midwest Family Law Conference, 42 IND. L. REV. 533, 563 
(2009). After a period of time, one spouse moved to Indiana. Indiana would not grant a divorce 
because it refused to recognize the California marriage; thinking that the same-sex marriage was 
void, the spouse in Indiana then married an opposite-sex partner. Id. The remarried spouse is 
now “possibly a bigamist under California law and faces possible prosecution if she moves 
back.” Id. at 564. 
144 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (striking a ban on interracial marriage as 
violating due process because the “freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the 
vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness”); see also Turner v. Safley, 
482 U.S. 78, 99–100 (1987) (holding that prisoners have a constitutional right to marry); 
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383–86 (1978) (upholding the right to marry even for people 
behind on child support payments from prior marriage because “the right to marry is of 
fundamental importance” and part of the Due Process Clause’s fundamental liberty). 
145 By analogy, imagine the husband in Loving also married a Caucasian woman in 
Virginia, which he could do because his previous marriage to an African-American was 
considered illegal and not recognized. If he then moved to a northern state that permitted 
interracial marriage, he could be arrested for bigamy because both marriages would be 
recognized as valid. 
146 Mandatory mediation is often used in child custody disputes. See Linda L. Berger, How 
Embedded Knowledge Structures Affect Judicial Decision Making: A Rhetorical Analysis of 
Metaphor, Narrative, and Imagination in Child Custody Disputes, 18 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 
259, 297 n.256 (2009) (noting that “mandatory mediation could take place before, not after, a 
family is severed”); Art Hinshaw, Mediators as Mandatory Reporters of Child Abuse: 
Preserving Mediation’s Core Values, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 271, 272 (2007) (noting that 
“mandatory mediation” is “prevalent in child custody cases”). 
147 Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 410 (1975) (upholding a one year residency requirement 
as a prerequisite to a court’s jurisdiction over a divorce). 
148 This rationale appeared persuasive to at least one trial court judge who granted a same-
sex divorce. See Leonard, supra note 83 (reporting the bench ruling in the case). The judge is 
reported as saying:  
I’m also concerned here that if the plaintiff wants to remarry in Canada that the way 
her union with Kinyati Hammond is ended has impact outside the State of New 
Jersey. She says in her certification, and I accept it as true, it’s undisputed that she 
plans to return to Canada to be remarried. And if she goes with a document that says 
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E. Avoiding Constitutional Conflicts  
In addition to the normative arguments that support granting 
divorces, there is an arguable constitutional problem created by states 
refusing to grant same-sex divorces. Autonomy149 also has 
constitutional dimensions;150 substantive due process protects 
decisions about marriage and family.151 More generally, liberty 
                                                                                                                  
 
dissolution of a civil union and what she had was a valid marriage in Canada, I think 
she has a valid concern that there could be issues raised in Canada. 
Id.  
149 See supra Part II.A (discussing the intrusion into personal autonomy that stems from 
states’ refusal to grant certain persons divorces). 
150 See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 91, at 426 (describing “individual human dignity” as a 
“[c]ardinal” belief in our Constitution and “political culture more generally,” defined as “people 
have the moral right—and the moral responsibility—to confront for themselves, answering to 
their own conscience and conviction, the most fundamental questions touching the meaning and 
value of their own lives”); Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Recognizing 
Constitutional Rights at Sentencing, 99 CAL. L. REV. 47, 81 (2011) (arguing that personal 
autonomy—the “power to make choices”—is central to protecting the “ability to participate 
effectively in the democratic process” and “underlies all the individual rights protected by the 
Constitution”); Gregory P. Magarian, Substantive Due Process as a Source of Constitutional 
Protection for Nonpolitical Speech, 90 MINN. L. REV. 247, 291 (2005) (addressing the Court’s 
“positive emphasis on personal autonomy” in Lawrence v. Texas and noting that if “the 
Constitution protects people’s prerogatives to live their lives as they see fit, then government 
interference with an individual’s decisions about matters central to personal autonomy can only 
be just if necessary to protect some other person’s concrete interest”); Smith, supra note 94, at 
177 (describing the “turn from liberty to autonomy” as reflecting “a shift from higher law views 
that justified the liberal state as the means of achieving a specific substantive goal, securing 
certain natural rights, to more relativistic stances that defend the state because it allows for the 
pursuit of self-chosen ends, now held to be the only ends that are legitimate”). Furthermore, 
those protected rights “provide spheres of freedom from government intrusion on individual 
choice.” Hessick & Hessick, supra note 150, at 81.  
151 The Supreme Court held this right existed in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. 
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). In Casey, the Court noted that “[o]ur precedents ‘have 
respected the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.’” Id. (quoting Prince v. 
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)). The Court concluded: 
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make 
in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the 
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to 
define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the 
mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of 
personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State. 
Id. See also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (“[O]ur laws and tradition 
afford constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, 
contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education.”); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. 
LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639–40 (1974) (citations omitted) (“[F]reedom of personal choice in 
matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.”).  
Not all “all important, intimate, and personal decisions” are constitutionally protected. 
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 727 (1997) (finding that Washington’s prohibition of 
assisted suicide was constitutional). But marriage is protected, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 
12 (1967) (“The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights 
 4/12/2012 11:09:23 AM 
2011] THE RIGHT TO (SAME-SEX) DIVORCE 475 
cannot be deprived without “due process of law.”152 Divorce arguably 
lies within the “domain of liberty”153 protected by due process. And 
denying same-sex couples the ability to divorce may “violate those 
‘fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of 
all our civil and political institutions.’”154 Granting divorces to same-
sex couples avoids these constitutional problems.155  
Furthermore, the Supreme Court is wary of limitations placed on 
the availability of a forum.156 Specifically in the context of divorce, 
                                                                                                                  
 
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”), as are “family living arrangements,” 
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977). 
152 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (prohibition on states); U.S. CONST. amend. V 
(prohibition on federal government).  
153 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937), overruled on other grounds by Benton 
v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 796 (1969). 
154 Id. at 328 (quoting Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926)). 
155 Equality concerns are also present. Equal protection arguments, however, are at least 
arguably less likely to be successful than due process arguments. See Kenji Yoshino, The New 
Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 794 (2011) (arguing that “equality” claims sound 
more like pleas for “‘special rights’” and are, therefore, less persuasive than “liberty” claims, 
which sound more like “‘human rights’” assertions). The reluctance of courts to hear divorce 
petitions affects, as described above in Part I.B, primarily same-sex couples. Hence, courts are 
arguably treating validly-married same-sex couples differently from validly-married opposite-
sex couples in violation of equal protection. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
Over the past few decades the Supreme Court has declined to extend—and has even 
curtailed—application of the equal protection doctrine. Yoshino, supra note 155, at 755–76. But 
it has, at the same time, expanded the reach of the due process doctrine to fill that void. Id. at 
776–87. Yoshino argues this result has occurred because our nation’s “pluralism anxiety” 
requires that the Court resist expanding protected groups. Id. at 758. Instead, the Court identifies 
common liberties that we all should possess. Id. at 776. Yoshino calls this the “‘liberty-based’ or 
‘equality-based’ dignity claim.” Id. at 749; see also Shannon Price Minter, The Great Divorce: 
The Separation of Equality and Democracy in Contemporary Marriage Jurisprudence, 19 S. 
CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 89, 107 (2010) (citation and quotations omitted) (arguing that it 
“would be a mistake” to “distinguish equal protection and due process too categorically” and, 
relying on the majority opinion in Lawrence v. Texas, pointing out that “[b]oth equal protection 
and due process include a powerful equality norm, and their interdependence is a key feature of 
American constitutional structure”); Laurence H. Tribe, Essay, Lawrence v. Texas: The 
“Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1902 (2004) 
(arguing that the Court, in Lawrence, blended “equal protection and substantive due process 
themes”).  
Yoshino asserts that this “liberty-based dignity claim” provides a means for the Supreme 
Court “to ‘do’ equality in an era of increasing pluralism anxiety.” Yoshino, supra note 155, at 
750. Other scholars note the power of this “dignity” claim, commenting that plaintiffs, in their 
briefs in same-sex marriage cases, often state they are “dignity-deprived.” Elizabeth F. Emens, 
Regulatory Fictions: On Marriage and Countermarriage, 99 CAL. L. REV. 235, 237 (2011). 
156 Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 523 (2004) (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 
371, 379 (1971)) (holding literal access to the courts is required by the Due Process Clause and 
stating “[t]he Due Process Clause also requires the States to afford certain civil litigants a 
‘meaningful opportunity to be heard’ by removing obstacles to their full participation in judicial 
proceedings”); M. L. B. v. S. L. J., 519 U.S. 102, 113 (1996) (recognizing termination of 
parental rights as a civil case “in which the State must provide access to its judicial processes 
without regard to a party’s ability to pay court fees”); Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 197–98 
(1971) (requiring the City of Chicago permit an appeal for conviction of a city ordinance despite 
the defendant’s inability to pay for transcripts, even though the defendant was not sentenced to 
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the Court has held that barriers to access which preclude petitioners 
from obtaining a divorce, such as fees imposed on the indigent, 
violate due process.157  
In Boddie v. Connecticut,158 the Court specifically required a 
“meaningful opportunity to be heard” for parties seeking a divorce.159 
The Court refused to declare that “access for all individuals to the 
courts is a right that is, in all circumstances, guaranteed by the Due 
Process Clause . . . .”160 But the Court singled out the nature of a 
divorce action: “this right is the exclusive precondition to the 
adjustment of a fundamental human relationship.”161 The Boddie 
Court relied heavily on the fact that court action was essential for a 
party to end a marriage lawfully,162 concluding that: 
[G]iven the basic position of the marriage relationship in this 
society’s hierarchy of values and the concomitant state 
monopolization of the means for legally dissolving this 
relationship, due process . . . prohibit[s] a state from denying, 
solely because of inability to pay, access to its courts to 
individuals who seek judicial dissolution of their 
marriages.163  
                                                                                                                  
 
jail and fined only a total of $500); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19–20 (1956) (plurality 
opinion) (requiring access to an appeal for indigent criminal defendants).  
When the Court does condone lack of a judicial remedy, some other avenue to resolve the 
claim exists. See, e.g., Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 389 (1983) (denying a federal employee the 
ability to sue his employer for defamation and retaliatory demotion because other substantive 
and procedural provisions provided an opportunity for relief). As the Court noted, the issue was 
“not what remedy the court should provide for a wrong that would otherwise go unredressed.” 
Id. at 388. Instead, the question was “whether an elaborate remedial system that has been 
constructed step by step, with careful attention to conflicting policy considerations, should be 
augmented by the creation of a new judicial remedy for the constitutional violation at issue.” Id.  
157 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 383 (1971). Ann Estin argues that beginning in 
the 1940s, with Williams v. North Carolina, the Supreme Court began seeing divorce as an 
individual right, whereby individuals were entitled to greater control over their marital status. 
Estin, supra note 33, at 425. Estin argues this shift connected the Court’s divorce cases with due 
process cases, although not articulated that clearly. Id. at 426. 
158 401 U.S. 371 (1971). 
159 Id. (“[D]ue process requires, at a minimum, that absent a countervailing state interest of 
overriding significance, persons forced to settle their claims of right and duty through the 
judicial process must be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard.”). 
160 Id. at 382. 
161 Id. at 383. 
162 Id. (stating that in seeking a divorce, “resort to the judicial process is entirely a state-
created matter”). 
163 Id. at 374. Estin asserts that “Boddie did not declare a constitutional right to divorce, but 
it linked divorce to other familial rights protected by the Constitution.” Estin, supra note 33, at 
427.  
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The Court described marriage as involving “interests of basic 
importance in our society”164—interests that the state properly 
oversees.165 The Court could not identify any instance “where two 
consenting adults may divorce and mutually liberate themselves from 
the constraints of legal obligations that go with marriage, and, more 
fundamentally, the prohibition against remarriage, without invoking 
the State’s judicial machinery.”166 Because of the state’s monopoly, 
the Court treated the plaintiffs seeking access to divorce similarly to 
criminal defendants: 
Thus, although they assert here due process rights as would-
be plaintiffs, we think appellants’ plight, because resort to the 
state courts is the only avenue to dissolution of their 
marriages, is akin to that of defendants faced with exclusion 
from the only forum effectively empowered to settle their 
disputes. Resort to the judicial process by these plaintiffs is 
no more voluntary in a realistic sense than that of the 
defendant called upon to defend his interests in court. For 
both groups this process is not only the paramount dispute-
settlement technique, but, in fact, the only available one.167  
Despite the Boddie Court’s strong language, states may impose 
some limitations. For example, a one-year residency requirement 
prior to filing for divorce does not violate due process.168 The state 
has an interest in “requiring that those who seek a divorce from its 
courts be genuinely attached to the State.”169 But a residency 
requirement “is not total deprivation, as in Boddie, but only delay. 
The operation of the filing fee in Boddie served to exclude forever a 
certain segment of the population from obtaining a divorce in the 
courts of Connecticut. No similar total deprivation is present”170 when 
the only bar to filing for divorce is a residency requirement.171  
                                                                                                                  
164 Boddie, 401 U.S. at 376. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. The Court distinguished marriage and divorce from commercial contracts, which 
may be entered and rescinded freely; citizens may not “covenant for or dissolve marriages 
without state approval.” Id. 
167 Id. at 376–77. 
168 Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 410 (1975). 
169 Id. at 409. The Court also found the one-year residency requirement proper because the 
proceeding was ex parte and the state’s finding of domicile was therefore not necessarily 
binding on another state; to prevent collateral attack, the one-year requirement was reasonable. 
Id. at 407–08. 
170 Id. at 410. 
171 Nevada retained the shortest residency requirement in the country for decades: six 
weeks. See Timothy B. Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 25 FAM. L.Q. 417, 
441 tbl.2 (1992). Many argue that the lenient laws of Nevada, as well as a few other states, 
created the opportunity for “migratory divorce.” Grossman, supra note 28, at 91.  
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Access to the courts is not required in all civil cases, though.172 
The Court has distinguished Boddie from those circumstances where 
denying access does not violate due process. For example, in finding 
no constitutional right to file a bankruptcy petition, the Court 
distinguished Boddie on several grounds, including the “state 
monopolization of the means for legally dissolving marriage”;173 the 
fact that the “denial of access to the judicial forum in Boddie touched 
directly . . . on the marital relationship,” which is of “fundamental 
importance”;174 and the government’s “control over the marriage 
relationship,” as opposed to the “establishment, enforcement, or 
dissolution of debts.”175  
Against that backdrop, the question is whether a state can justify 
its refusal to grant some divorces. Without much doubt, states have a 
legitimate interest in regulating marriage.176 And states have some 
legitimate concerns about granting divorces to same-sex couples to 
                                                                                                                  
172 See, e.g., United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 446 (1973) (holding there is no 
constitutional right to discharge debts in bankruptcy and hence refusing access based on 
inability to pay the filing fee does not violate due process or equal protection). 
173 Id. at 441. 
174 Id. at 444. 
175 Id. at 445. 
176 See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978) (noting that “reasonable regulations 
that do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marital relationship may 
legitimately be imposed”); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 585 (2003) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (stating that “Texas cannot assert any legitimate state interest here, such as national 
security or preserving the traditional institution of marriage”); Mark Strasser, Same-Sex 
Marriage and the Right to Privacy, 13 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 117, 144–45 (2011) (acknowledging 
that “[p]romoting marriage is considered a legitimate state interest”). 
The state interests asserted for regulating the right to marry differ from those that can be 
asserted for or against recognizing marriages or granting divorces to same-sex couples validly 
married in another jurisdiction. The state interest asserted most frequently in the right to marry 
context is preserving the traditional institution of marriage. See Kern v. Taney, 11 Pa. D. & C. 
558, 575–76, No. 09–10739, I.D. #2, 2010 WL 2510988 (Pa. Com. Pl. Mar. 15, 2010) 
(discussing and accepting Pennsylvania’s asserted interest in the institution of marriage when 
refusing to grant a same-sex couple a divorce); see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 585 (O’Connor, 
J. concurring) (disagreeing with Texas’s interest in preserving traditional marriage to support its 
criminal sodomy laws). 
In at least one same-sex divorce case, the court conflated these two issues. In re Marriage 
of J.B. & H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654, 674 (Tex. App. 2010). In that case, the appellee characterized 
“the rights in question as the ‘freedom to marry a person of one’s own choosing’ and the 
concomitant right to end such a marriage with a divorce.” Id. The court therefore framed the 
right at issue as the “right to marry a person of the same sex.” Id. at 675. The “legitimate [state] 
interest” in prohibiting same-sex marriage was “promoting the raising of children in households 
headed by opposite-sex couples.” Id. at 677.  
Although this state interest is arguably valid in the marriage context, it is irrelevant in the 
divorce context. If anything, this state interest provides a rationale for prohibiting opposite-sex 
couples from divorcing; it does not provide a reason to prohibit same-sex couples from 
divorcing. And at most it involves recognizing same-sex marriages, not granting them. 
Similarly, Sherif Girgis, Robert George, and Ryan Anderson assert that permitting same-sex 
marriage: (1) weakens real marriage; (2) obscures “the value of opposite-sex parenting as an 
ideal”; and (3) threatens “moral and religious freedom.” Girgis et al., supra note 100, at 260, 
262–63. These state interests, however, are also unrelated to divorce.  
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the extent that it requires them to recognize the underlying marriage, 
which might suggest approval177 of same-sex marriages.178 Moreover, 
granting some divorces could require on-going state intervention for 
purposes of support or child custody and that state involvement could 
also legitimize the underlying relationship.179 
But Boddie arguably requires heightened scrutiny180 when denying 
access to a court—at least in the context of divorce. Although it did 
not expressly delineate the right to divorce as a “fundamental right,” 
the Court described access to the legal system as fundamental: 
“Perhaps no characteristic of an organized and cohesive society is 
more fundamental than its erection and enforcement of a system of 
rules defining the various rights and duties of its members, enabling 
them to govern their affairs and definitively settle their differences in 
an orderly, predictable manner.”181 
The Court suggested some form of heightened scrutiny was 
appropriate when it stated that “due process requires, at a minimum, 
that absent a countervailing state interest of overriding significance, 
persons forced to settle their claims of right and duty through the 
judicial process must be given a meaningful opportunity to be 
heard.”182 Because Connecticut refused to “admit these appellants to 
                                                                                                                  
177 This justification is similar to the “expressive or communicative” justification for 
punishment, where punishment is conceptualized “as a form of communication that expresses 
society’s moral condemnation of criminal wrongdoing.” Sigler, supra note 97, at 165. 
178 See Michael E. Solimine, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage, the Public 
Policy Exception, and Clear Statements of Extraterritorial Effect, 41 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 105, 
124 n.64 (2010) (citing sources that discuss the policy rational for refusing to recognize same-
sex marriages). Tobias Wolff has articulated three rationales for states’ refusal to recognize 
same-sex marriages entered elsewhere: (1) regulate sexual activity; (2) express moral 
disapproval; and (3) dissuade migration to the state. Wolff, supra note 19, at 2218–37. Wolff 
rejected the first interest because states can no longer regulate consensual sexual activity by 
virtue of Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). And states are no longer entitled, according 
to Wolff, to express their moral disapproval of a particular group under Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 
585 (O’Connor, J., concurring), and Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631–32 (1996) (striking 
Colorado’s Amendment 2 as irrational because “its sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the 
reasons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the 
class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests”). Wolff, supra note 
19, at 2231–33. Finally, Wolff argued that states may not discourage migration to the state 
under Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 506 (1999) (stating that “a purpose to deter welfare applicants 
from migrating to California” would be “unequivocally impermissible”). Wolff, supra note 19, 
at 2236–37. 
179 See, e.g., In re Marriage of J.B. & H.B., 326 S.W.3d at 666 (noting the “appellee seeks 
to ‘give effect’ to his marriage under Texas law by seeking a division of the parties’ community 
property in the event they are unable to agree on a property division”).  
180 See Hogue, supra note 22, at 240 (referring to a “stricter standard of review because of 
the fundamental character of the interest involved”). Even without heightened scrutiny, the state 
cannot be motivated by animus. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 585 O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(noting that such motivation “runs contrary to the values of the Constitution and the Equal 
Protection Clause, under any standard of review”). 
181 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971). 
182 Id. at 377 (emphasis added). Furthermore, in 1996 the Court described the 
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its courts, the sole means in Connecticut for obtaining a divorce,” 
unless Connecticut could demonstrate “a sufficient countervailing 
justification,” the state impermissibly denied them due process.183 
The Court also discussed “other alternatives” available to the state,184 
which suggests it was applying more than a mere rational basis 
analysis.  
The Boddie Court ultimately held that “a State may not, consistent 
with the . . . Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, pre-
empt the right to dissolve this legal relationship without affording all 
citizens access to the means it has prescribed for doing so.”185 To 
reach this result, the Court relied on the fact that the right to access 
the courts for a divorce “is the exclusive precondition to the 
adjustment of a fundamental human relationship” and noted that 
“resort to the judicial process is entirely a state-created matter.”186  
Even if a state’s interest in denying its residents access to a forum 
to pursue a divorce is legitimate, this interest arguably does not rise to 
the level of “overriding significance.”187 First, states can grant 
divorces without recognizing same-sex marriages for purposes of 
marriage. Divorce is arguably “a ‘benefit’ of state residency, rather 
than a ‘legal protection, benefit, or responsibility’ resulting from 
marriage.”188 Courts can grant divorces to same-sex couples lawfully 
                                                                                                                  
 
“fundamental interest at stake” in Boddie as “[c]rucial to our decision.” M. L. B. v. S. L. J., 519 
U.S. 102, 113 (1996). The Court also acknowledged the “fundamental importance” of “the 
associational interests that surround the establishment and dissolution of th[e] [marital] 
relationship.” Id. at 114 (citation and quotations omitted). 
183 Boddie, 401 U.S. at 380–81 (emphasis added). The Court rejected the state’s interests in 
preventing frivolous lawsuits, allocation of scarce resources, and balancing defendants’ rights to 
notice with plaintiffs’ rights to access the courts. Id. at 381. The Court concluded that “none of 
these considerations is sufficient to override the interest . . . in having access to the only avenue 
open for dissolving their allegedly untenable marriages.” Id. The state interest involved here—
avoiding implicit approval of same-sex marriage—is stronger than the financial interests 
asserted in many of the cases involving access to the courts. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Lane, 541 
U.S. 509, 533 (2004) (noting that “ordinary considerations of cost and convenience alone cannot 
justify a State’s failure to provide individuals with a meaningful right of access to the courts”). 
But even the interest of avoiding implicit approval does not appear to rise to the level required 
by the Court. See infra notes 188–92 and accompanying text. 
184 Boddie, 401 U.S. at 381. 
185 Id. at 383. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. at 377. 
188 State v. Naylor, 330 S.W.3d 434, 441 (Tex. App. 2011). The court also acknowledged 
that the state statute at issue in Naylor, which resembled most states, could be interpreted the 
statute’s “plain language” as precluding only “actions that create, recognize, or give effect to 
same-sex marriages on a ‘going-forward’ basis, so that the granting of a divorce would be 
permissible.” Id. The appellate court expressed “no opinion on the merit of these arguments,” 
but concluded that “the fact remains that there are interpretations of [the Texas divorce statute] 
that would allow the trial court to grant the divorce without finding the statute unconstitutional.” 
Id. at 442.  
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married in another jurisdiction and yet refuse, on traditional 
“marriage” grounds, to provide benefits of marriage, such as tax 
benefits, spousal immunity, and other rights, to those couples that 
remain married in the state.189 
Second, the asserted state interests are not furthered by denying 
divorce. Although those interests create an argument for denying the 
right to marry, divorce is fundamentally different from marriage. 
Contrary to marriage, which creates a new familial bond subject to 
state control, divorce ends the familial relationship.190 State interests 
in divorce are not as profound as those relating to marriage. This 
explains why states generally grant divorces even when they object to 
the underlying marriage.191  
Because states generally have an obligation to permit divorces, and 
because denying same-sex couples the right to divorce raises 
significant constitutional concerns, states ought to grant divorces in 
all cases, including those involving same-sex couples.  
CONCLUSION 
Divorce is commonplace in America. Yet for same-sex couples, 
most of the courts that have considered their divorce petitions have 
refused to address the merits, holding instead that they lack subject-
matter jurisdiction. These courts rely on state constitutional or 
statutory provisions that prohibit recognizing same-sex marriages 
entered into elsewhere, or simply on generic principles of statutory 
construction, to find that there is no valid “marriage” to dissolve.  
The problem is created in large part by residency requirements. 
Same-sex couples often cannot get divorced in the state where they 
                                                                                                                  
189 See supra note 23 (citing commentators that argue under an “incidents of marriage” 
approach, states can grant divorces without otherwise accepting the validity of an out-of-state 
same-sex marriage). 
190 See, e.g., Christiansen v. Christiansen, 253 P.3d 153, 156 (Wyo. 2011) (noting that 
recognizing a same-sex marriage for purposes of ending the marriage did not lessen the state’s 
interest in preventing same-sex marriages); Wardle, supra note 129, at 590–91 (distinguishing a 
judicial adoption decree, which begins a family relationship, from a divorce, which “terminates 
an ongoing relationship” and requires no “further supervision of the spousal relationship”). 
191 See supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text (discussing states’ granting of divorces 
to first cousins and bigamous marriages). Also, the Supreme Court requires that states recognize 
divorce decrees of other states, Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 302–304 (1942), even 
when inconsistent with a state’s public policy. See, e.g., Rena M. Lindevaldsen, Same-Sex 
Relationships and the Full Faith and Credit Clause: Reducing America to the Lowest Common 
Denominator, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 29, 65 (2009) (distinguishing a decision 
“whether to nationalize a parentage standard through the full faith and credit obligation” as 
raising “unique concerns that are not implicated to the same degree in the Supreme Court 
precedent requiring a state to give full faith and credit to a divorce decree rendered in another 
state even if the divorce decree violates the public policy of the receiving state”). 
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were married because they are not (or are no longer) residents there. 
But the state where they reside refuses to hear the case. 
States have an interest in regulating marriage.192 But they also 
have an obligation—both morally and arguably constitutionally—to 
permit parties to voluntarily terminate their marital relationship. This 
is especially true when denying subject-matter jurisdiction results in 
the complete absence of any forum to hear the dispute, creating a 
“palpable hardship” to the married couple.193 And because divorce 
terminates the marital relationship, states do not have the same 
interests in refusing to grant a same-sex divorce that they would in 
either prohibiting a same-sex marriage or in recognizing an ongoing 
same-sex marital relationship194 within their jurisdiction.195 Denying 
the right to divorce means the same-sex couple remains married—
precisely the result the state objects to in the first instance.  
At least five potential solutions emerge. First, courts can construe 
their statutes (and constitutions, if applicable) to preclude furthering a 
same-sex marriage but not dissolving it. This would permit courts to 
assert subject-matter jurisdiction and grant same-sex divorces. 
Second, courts of general jurisdiction can exercise their equity powers 
to confer subject-matter jurisdiction, in order to avoid “palpable 
hardship,” and grant same-sex divorces. Third, courts can construe 
their statutes (and constitutions, if applicable) as violating the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process requirement and, accordingly, 
find that the court has subject-matter jurisdiction and grant same-sex 
divorces. Fourth, legislatures can repeal state statutes that prohibit 
recognizing same-sex marriages. Fifth, legislatures can amend their 
divorce laws to make it clear that even if state statutes generally 
                                                                                                                  
192 See supra note 176 and accompanying text.  
193 Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956, 966–67 (R.I. 2007) (asserting that the “court has 
no power to grant relief in the absence of jurisdiction” and suggesting the legislature ought to 
solve the problem, but acknowledging that “this observation may be cold comfort to the parties 
before us”); see also supra note 148 (reporting another judge’s acknowledgement of the 
hardship a same-sex couple would face if the court refused to grant the divorce). 
194 The Wyoming Supreme Court recognized this in Christiansen. See supra notes 86–88 
and accompanying text (discussing the Wyoming Supreme Court’s rationale for allowing a 
same-sex couple to divorce in Wyoming); see also LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE MARRIAGE 
CONTRACT: SPOUSES, LOVERS, AND THE LAW 228 (1981) (“Clearly, a less uniform and less 
rigid legal system is needed in a pluralistic society as diverse and heterogeneous as ours”). 
195 With regard to on-going court involvement, many states address these issues absent 
marriage, Gonzalez v. Green, 831 N.Y.S.2d 856, 857, 861 (Sup. Ct. 2006) (enforcing the 
parties’ million dollar separation agreement despite finding no valid Massachusetts same-sex 
marriage), especially when they involve children, Jones v. Jones, 884 A.2d 915, 919 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 2005) (granting custody of a minor child to the biological mother’s former same-sex 
partner). See generally William B. Turner, The Lesbian De Facto Parent Standard in Holtzman 
v. Knott: Judicial Policy Innovation and Diffusion, 22 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 135 
(2007) (discussing custody disputes between legally unmarried and same-sex couples).  
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prevent recognizing same-sex marriages for purpose of marriage, 
courts are empowered to grant same-sex divorces. 
Finally, and perhaps the most appropriate, states that permit same-
sex marriage should provide a forum, without residency restrictions, 
for same-sex divorce.196 Residency requirements are at the crux of 
this dilemma. States that helped create this conflict—those that grant 
same-sex marriages—ought to help solve it. 
 
 
                                                                                                                  
196 After this Article was written, the District of Columbia passed a bill doing just that. 
D.C. CODE § 16–902(b)(1) (effective April 19, 2012). That statute states:  
An action for divorce by persons of the same gender, even if one of or neither party 
to the marriage is a bona fide resident of the District of Columbia at the time the 
action is commenced, shall be maintainable if the following apply: 
(A) The marriage was performed in the District of Columbia; and 
(B) Neither party to the marriage resides in a jurisdiction that will 
maintain an action for divorce; provided that it shall be a rebuttable 
presumption that a jurisdiction will not maintain an action for divorce if 
the jurisdiction does not recognize the marriage. 
 
